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5 FOREWORD 
In  recent  years  there  bas  been  a  growing 
tendency  to  place  the  economies of  separate 
countries  in  a  much  broader  setting.  This 
tendency  is reflected in  the  creation of inter-
national  organizations,  in economie integration 
and association, and in international agreements 
of  a  general or specifie kind. Relations among 
countries,  and  especially their tracte relations, 
have  thereby  acquired  a  much  more distinctly 
multilateral character than  they  used to have. 
In  this  new  situation,  the  impact of any single 
country'  s  agricultural polie  y  measures on  the 
world  market  and  their  distorting effects on 
international tracte are more marked than ever, 
in spi  te of all the rules which have been devised 
to govern international trade. New attempts are, 
therefore  1  now  being  made  in  many fields  to 
arrive  at the  formulation of rules designed for 
wider purposes,  and  in  particular to  work out 
a new order for the world markets of agricultural 
commodities. 
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A  world-wide  solution of this kind raises sorne 
extraordinarily complex problems.  Anxious  to 
make  its  contribution  to  the  examination  of 
these problems, the EEC Commission requested 
Dr  Albrecht  Kruse-Rodenacker  of  the  Tech-
nische Universitlit,  Berlin,  to write a study, in 
which  a  critical analysis of past and  current 
meàsures to protect agriculture  would lead up 
to  the  formulation  of  principles which  might 
govern  trade  regulations  on  an  international 
plane.  The  EEC  Commission  expresses  its 
sincere  gratitude  to  Dr A.  Kruse-Rodenacker 
for  the fundamental  contribution he has  made 
with the study which follows. 
However  1  this  study is not  to be taken as rep-
resenting the Commission'  s views on the matter, 
nor does it in any wayprejudge the Commission's 
future  attitude  in  international  discussions. INTRODUCTION 
During  the  last  twenty  or thirty years agri-
culture  bas  more  and  more  come  to  play  a 
peripheral  part  in  the  economie  expansion 
of  many  countries. Economie theory, economie 
po  licy and the work of international organizations 
alike  show  up  an  increasingly sharp  cleavage 
betweeen  agriculture  and  industry.  In  many 
developed  countries  the  two  sectors today  no 
longer have a commonlanguage. Communication 
among  experts  and  co-operation  among  the 
government  authorities  responsible  for  eco-
nomie  policy  are  going  from  bad  to  worse. 
Domestically,  conflicts  of  interests  are 
becoming  keener,  and  internationally  the 
problems  of  world  agricultural  trade  in  its 
interconnections with tracte in manufactures are 
causing growing  disturbances.  It is impossible 
to  exaggerate  the consequences of the isolation 
of  agriculture,  both  in  national  and  in inter-
national terms. 
In  many a country we witness the emergence of 
a sort of Monroe doctrine for agriculture, as an 
expression  of  the  belief  that  the  countries 
concerned  can  afford  to,  and  indeed  should, 
keep  their  agriculture insulated and protected. 
But  imbalances  and  contradictions  in  world 
agricultural trade have  reached  a  point where 
it becomes imperative to reorganize the market 
for  agricultural commodities. How is this to be 
done,  when  the  agricultural  sector  is  being 
withdrawn  more  and  more from  the  reach of 
the  classical  rules  of  competition  and  the 
classical  mechanism  of  world  tracte ?  This is 
the subject of the study which follows. 
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The free  competitive  adjustment of supply and 
demand bas  been ruled out for  decades  in the 
agricultural sector by all kinds of interventions. 
For  many  reasons,  which  will  be  discussed 
presently,  the  introduction  of  a  competitive 
market system is not feasible today inpractice. 
Nevertheless,  the  discussion which follows ad-
heres  to  the principle that government inter-
vention  in  the  agricultural  sector ought  to  be 
minimized.  The term  " organization "  of world 
agricultural markets is meant  in  the  sense of 
establishing  a  new  order,  and not in any insti-
tutional or administrative sense. 
The  first  part  of  the  study  analyses  existing 
imbalances  in  the  world'  s  markets for  agri-
cultural  commodities.  This  is  followed  by  a 
discussion of possible ways to reorganize world 
agricultural  markets.  The  purpose  is  not  to 
propose  deviees  simply  for  dealing  with  the 
symptoms of  imbalance, but to suggest how the 
very  causes  of  imbalance  and  contradictions 
can  be  removed. 
The  study  is  primarily concerned with  those 
food  produc1:s  which  are now  in  the  limelight 
of  international discussion,  but  the  results of 
the  investigation  are equally  relevant to other 
agricultural commodities. 
The  author  wishes  to  avail  himself  of  this 
opportunity  to  express  his  gratitude  to  the 
Directorate-General for  Agriculture, for their 
fruitful collaboration, A.  CURRENT RELATIONSHIPS  AMONG  NATIONAL AG RI CULTURAL MARKETS 
!.  ANALYSIS  BY GROUPS  OF  COUNTRIES 
1. FIVE  GROUPS OF COUNTRIES 
In  analysing  current  relationships  among 
nadonal  agricultural markets  we  make  a  dis-
tinction  between  industrialized and  non-indus-
trialized  countries. (  1)  Sin ce,  however,  both 
these broad groups  comprise countries of en-
tirely different patterns of production and foreign 
tracte,  the  results  are  meaningful  only  to  a 
rather limited extent. 
Severa!  fundamental  studies  of  the  tendencies 
and  problems  of  the  world economy have  the 
crippling  defect  that countries  at comparable 
stages  of  economie  development  are  lumped 
together in one and the same group, even though 
they  may  occupy  very  different  positions  in 
world tracte.  For this  reason  we  introduce  a 
rather more refined distinction into the classi-
fication by development stages. 
Sin ce  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth century, 
when  economists first began to  think in terms 
of  economie  stages, until  our modern analysis 
of  stages of  economie  growth,  severa! classi-
fication schemes have been worked out to group 
countries  at  different  stages of  development. 
We  want  to  go further still, and to group coun-
tries  according  to  their  position  in  world 
agricultural  tracte,  with  particular reference, 
in the context of this study, to the different parts 
they  may  be playing in creating or maintaining 
market imbalances. 
From  this  point  of  view  we  establish  five 
groups  of  countries  with  reference  to  the 
world  market  in  agricultural  commodities : 
FIVE  GROUPS OF  COUNTRIES 
l) Developing  countries  with  a 
) 
static economy 
low stage 
2)  Developing  countries  with  a  of development 
dynamic e con  orny 
3) Centrally  planned  communist  } 
intermediate stage 
economies  of development 
(
1
)  The  principles according to which  countries  are  regarded as 
belonging  to  one  or  the  other group are  those adopted by  GATT 
and the United Nations. 
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4) Developed  agricultural  export 
countries 
5) Developed indus  trial countries  1 
high stage 
of development 
The countries under 1)  and 2)  are the developing 
(underdeveloped,  that  is,  non-industrialized) 
countries  in  the true sense of the word.  Group 
3)  comprises the countries of the Eastern Bloc, 
most of which are already at a fairly high stage 
of  development and in sorne cases are really to 
be regarded as developed, th  at is, industrialized. 
Groups  4)  and  5)  are the  developed and highly 
developed countries. 
The  main  features  of  these  five  groups  are 
sketched below, and certain countries are cited 
to  illustrate  particular  points.  It would  be 
neither  useful  nor  advisable  to  allocate  each 
country  to  one  of  the  five  groups  and  so to 
" grade " them.  What  matters for this study is 
not to allocate gradings but to show clearly how 
greatly the positions of the  se groups differ wh en 
looked at from the angle of world tracte. 
2. DISTINGUISHING  FEATURES  OF  THE  FIVE  GROUPS  OF 
COUNTRIES 
1) Developing countries with a static economy 
Examples of  countries belonging  to  this group 
are Nepal, Tanganyika and Bolivia. Countries in 
this group are still in the pre-development stage, 
which  precedes economie  development every-
where.  We  call  their  economy  static in  the 
sense  that  no  radical  change has as yet taken 
place  in  their productive structure, or at least 
none is as yet visible.  It is,  of course, perfectly 
possible  that  these  countries are already de-
velopment-conscious,  that  there  is  a  certain 
amount  of  local initiative  and  that production 
begins  to  expand.  Society in these countries is 
traditional  in  the  sense that its structure is on 
the who le still characterized by inherited forms 
rather  than  by  those  which  are  a  necessary 
condition for  sustained economie development. 
Agriculture,  as  a  rule, is  at  a  very low level 
of  development  in  countries of  this  type; it is 
subsistence agriculture, with households largely 
" closed "  in  respect  of  production  and  con-
sumption.  The bulk - sorne 70 percent - of the 
labour force is engaged in agriculture, and there 
is  a  considerable degree of open and disguised 
unemployment.  Industry  is still absent.  In  so far  as there is anything more than a negligible 
tradition  of  manufacture,  it  is mostly  of  the 
artisan  type.  Local  trade  occupies  a  fairly 
important  place,  but  there  is  no  developed 
domestic  market.  The rate of investment is 
very low - say, 5 percent or less.  The economy 
still lacks  the  distinctive features which would 
characterize it as" national" : political factions, 
regional  autocracy  in  administration,  and  the 
absence of  anything  like a developed system of 
money,  capital or communications prevent the 
emergence of  an  efficient domestic market.  It. 
is not precluded th  at sorne bran  ch of production, 
or sorne region, may achieve a notable expansion 
of output, but the net domestic product as a whole, 
and  with  it  per  caput  income,  never exceed 
certain limita in this initial stage. 
The  structure  of  society  has  undergone  no 
radical  change  and  is closely  connected with 
the  structure  of  agriculture.  The  individual 
has very little chances of improving his station. 
The  majority  of  the population can hardly hope 
to  better the  ir own  or the  ir children'  s  social 
statua  or  standard  of  life.  For this reason 
people  display  no  initiative.  Any change in the 
social  and  economie  structure is taboo  to  the 
ruling class, and for  the _subjects  lies outside 
any  of  the  categories  of  their  thought  and 
action. 
As  a  consequence of  these  structural charac-
teristics,  countries  of  this  type  participate 
only  to a very limited extent in world trade and 
are  in  no  position  either  to  aggravate or to 
mitigate existing imbalances in the world market 
for agricultural commoditieso  · 
2) Developing  countries  with  a  dynamic  economy 
The group of developing countries with a dynamic 
economy · includes  roughly  half  the  world's 
nations.  India,  Egypt and Colombia may serve 
as  typical examples.  Sorne of them are on the 
eve of  their transition into the higher develop-
ment stage of group 4). 
Ever since  industrialization began  under Eng-
land's lead more and more countries have been 
emerging from  the  static initial stage.  It may 
be  assumed  that  eventually  the  process  of 
structural  social  and  economie  change  will 
spread  to  practically  an  countries.  This 
process  is  often  set in  motion or intensified 
by  contact  with  the  outside  world.  More 
especially  it  is  stimulated  by  the  growing 
internationalization  of  political  and  economie 
interests,  including the creation of large blocs. 
Structural economie change, which is the essen-
ti  al  characteristic  of  a  dynamic  economy, is 
evident  in  an existing branches  of  production 
and  new  ones  begin  to  appear.  Production 
becomes  more  diversified.  Agriculture  still  · 
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has  more  relative  weight  than  industry  and 
trade,  accounting,  as it does,  for  50 to 70 per 
cent  of  employment  and  for  a  sizeable share 
in the gross national product (about ~0 per cent) 
and in  exporta.  The higher rate of investment 
(about  10  per  cent),  is an important feature. 
Investment may be  located in the most diverse 
sectors,  according  to  existing  raw  material 
resources, national priorities or the pattern of 
foreign trade, but in general industry is assuming 
growing importance.  Separate economie regions 
within  the  country begin to merge in a more or 
less  unified  market.  Economie growth tran-
scenda.  the  limita  circumscribing  the  static 
economy  and  becomes  a  deliberate purpose of 
economie po  licy. 
We  know  of  no  single  country  in  which  the 
process of structural economie change came, or 
is coming,  to pass without  radical  changes in 
the  social  structure.  There are, it is true, 
quite  a  few  countries where  social change is 
promoted  or accepted only  half-heartedly  and 
does not go far enough, so that economie growth 
is  slow  or  indeed  the  country  relapses into 
stagnation for prolonged periods. Nevertheless, 
once  structural change has  begun, it acquires 
a  certain  momentum  of  its own  and  receives 
continuous  support from  outside.  Yet there is 
nothing  to  justify  the  expectation of continuous 
development.  It may weil happen that the social 
structure hardens after initial sucees  ses and so 
leads  to  economie  stagnation at a higher level, 
either  paralysing  the  process  of  structural 
economie  change  for  an  indefinite  period or 
arresting it altogether. 
Sorne  of  the  countries  in this  group enter the 
world market for foodstuff  s  as  suppliera  and, 
given  the  ir  need  to  earn  foreign  ex  change, 
must  continue  to  do  so.  Many  more of the 
countries  in  this  group  fail  co  exercice  as 
much demand on the world food market as would 
correspond to  their needs.  This is so for two 
reasons,  to  be  discussed in more detail later : 
first, shortage of foreign exchange, and secondly, 
absence of sufficient infrastructures, especially 
as regards storage, processing and distribution 
facilities.  The same, incidentally, applies also 
to countries of group 1). 
3) Centrally  planned communist economies 
Sorne  of  the  countries in  this  group  are to be 
regarded  as  developed  industrial  countries. 
AU  of  them  have  this  in  common,  that  they 
attribute to industrialization the decisive part in 
maximizing  the  aggregate  rate  of  economie 
growth.  F ollowing the the  ses of Marx and Lenin, 
industrialization is given absolute priority over 
all other sec  tors of the economy.  This applies even  to  countries whose  natural  raw material 
resources  place  certain limits  upon  industri-
alization. 
It  is not  a  distinguishing feature  of  countries 
in  this  group  that  heavy  industry  plays  the 
dominant part in economie growth, for the same 
thing  was,  and  is, true of  western  industrial 
nations.  Nor  is the  distribution of investment 
among the capital and consumer goods industries 
a  distinguishing  feature,  in  so  far  as  in  the 
USSR,  the  leading  country  in  group  3),  the 
relevant proportions have in recent years come 
rather  close  to  those  of  the  western world. 
Fin  ally,  it is not peculiar to the development of 
these  countries  that important  sections of  the 
infrastructure have  been neglected, so as to be 
able  to  concentrate  on  investment  with  high 
capital  returns.  This  was  typical  also  of 
countries  in  groups  4)  and  5)  at comparable 
stages of their development. 
But in other respects the pattern of development 
in centrally planned economies differs very much 
from that in countries of groups 4)  and 5).  This 
applies  in  particular  to  agriculture.  In  the 
leading  communist  countries  the  productivity 
of  agriculture is relatively  low,  both  on  their 
own  showing  and  in  terms  of  international 
comparisons.  Agriculture  ties  down  a  large 
part of  the  labour force  - more than half of it 
in the USSR  only a few years ago. 
Agriculture is drawn upon to an extraordinarily 
large extent for  capital formation in industrial 
sectors.  At  the  same  time,  the  pattern  of 
agriculture  is  subject  to  sudden  alterations. 
Ali  in all, the value of agricultural output rises 
only  very  slowly,  and  prolonged  periods  of 
stagnation or even retrogression  in output per 
head of the population are by no me  ans excluded. 
The countries of this group participate in world 
tracte  only to the limited extent of 11  per cent of 
its total.  Apart from intra-trade among them-
selves, they make only an increasingly irregular 
appearance  as  suppliers  of  foodstuffs  on  the 
world  market  for  agricultural  commodities. 
Measured in terms of their per caput incarne and 
domestic  production,  there  must be  a  consid-
erable potential demand for food in the countries 
of  this group at an intermediate stage of devel-
opment.  This demand is likely to increase in the 
future, but it remains to be seen whether it will 
be  met  by  imports in  the absence of sufficient 
domestic  production.  The  FAO  projections 
explicitly  allow  for  the  possibility  of  such 
imports.  There are severa!  reasons  why the 
countries  of  group  3)  have  so far restricted 
their net  imports  of  food from other groups of 
countries.  Apart from  the priority of  import 
requirements for  industrial products, the chief 
reasons  are  to  be  sought  in  the  institutional 
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rigidity  of  foreign  economie  relations - e.g. 
bilateral  settlement  of  foreign  payments,  the 
principle  of  balance-of-payments  equilibrium 
over  given  periods,  barter  transactions,  the 
pur  suit of autarky, etc. 
It  is true  that  in  recent years the countries of 
group  3)  have  been buying major food products 
abroad,  but  even  their large food imports have 
not  come  anywhere near exhausting their re-
serves of unsatisfied demand. Even though sorne 
of  these countries have  been exporting certain 
commodities for  decades,  the  prospect for the 
future re  mains that the problem of oversaturated 
agricultural  markets is  a long way off in these 
countries. 
4) Developed agricultural export countries 
This group comprises primarily the countries 
of the southern temperate zone, such as Argen-
tina,  Uruguay,  the  Republic  of  South  Africa  .. 
Australia and New Zealand. 
From  the  point of  view of their relatively high 
per capita incarne  and  the pattern of their pro-
duction,  these countries  must be  regarded as 
developed.  In  sorne  of  them,  indeed,  sec  tors 
other  than  agriculture contribute  a  consider-
able  share  to  the  national  product,  but  the 
country'  s  predominantly  agricultural  type  is 
still  reflected  in  the  composition of  exports. 
Agricultural production generally rests on fa-
vourable soil and climatic conditions.  Further-
more, tarrn units are of favourable size and the 
application of modern techniques, buttressed by 
often  large-scale  investment  in  rural  infra-
structures,  leads  to  extraordinarily high agri-
cultural productivity. 
Far from  contracting un der  the  impact of  the 
outflow  of  agricultural  labour  toward  other 
economie  sec  tors,  agricultural  output  keeps 
rising. 
The  countries of  this  group  consistently offer 
growing  supplies of  food  on  the world market. 
Since  they  cannat  maintain  or improve their 
standard of  living without exporting food, these 
countries  will  no  doubt  continue  to  press as 
hard  as  they  can  for  further  outlets.  This 
applies  also  to  those of  the  countries in this 
group  which place increasing emphasis on the 
diversification  of  their  production.  Growing 
imports of  manufactures,  and  more especially 
of capital goods, swell their demand for foreign 
exchange,  which  they wish to earn by exporting 
agricultural commodities. 
These countries do  not exercise much demand 
on  world  markets for food  products, because each of  them produces many foods in sufficient 
quantity  and  adequate  quality  arid range for its 
own needs. 
5) Developed indus trial countries 
This group is made up  of the countries of North 
America(1), the European Economie Community 
and  the  European Pree Tracte Association, and 
Japan. 
The  industry of  these  countries is the work of 
three generations of  their peoples.  In spite of 
differences  in  the  concepts  and  means  of 
economie  policy,  industrial  growth followed  a 
remarkably  uniîorm  pattern  in  all  these 
countries.  Each of them, it is true, specialized 
on  particular branches,  such  as machine tools 
and  machinery,  the  chemical  or  electrical 
industry,  etc.,  but by  and  large  the structural 
characteristics  of  industrial  growth were  the 
same.  The mere size of the  ir national in  come, 
net investment, foreign  trade and international 
liquidities now  put the industrial countries in a 
position  where  they  can  exercise  a  decisive 
influence  on  the  future  course  of  the  world 
economy.  It is  in  this  sense that we speak of 
them as highly developed. 
Productivity  having  grown  more  rapidly  in 
industry  th  an  in  agriculture,  the  se co  un tries 
nowadays  are led more  and  more  to  transfer 
part of  the non-agricultural sectors1  income to 
agriculture.  Agricultural production is, there-
fore, stimulated not only by technological prog-
ress,  but  also  by  income  transfers,  and for 
sorne  years  has  tended  to  grow  faster  than 
domestic  consumption.  No  reversai  of  this 
tendency  is to  be  expected  and  the  saturation 
of markets will increase. 
In  the  light  of these developments the situation 
of  exporters of  agricultural  commodities, es-
pecially  in  this  group  of  countries,  threatens 
to  become  more  and  more difficult.  They will 
make  every  effort  not  only  to  maintain, but to 
improve  their  position  on  the  world market. 
Yet  these efforts are doomed to failure at least 
to  the extent that the import margin narrows in 
the importing countries of the same group, which 
so far  were  among  the major and most secure 
outlets  for  food  products  on  the  international 
market. 
(
1
)  Here  and elsewhere the  term  North America always includes 
the United States of America and Canada. 
14 
6) The  position of agriculture  in  the  economies  of 
the {ive groups 
It is typical  of countries with a static economy 
(group 1)  that manufacturing industry contributes 
little,  and  much less than  in  any  other group, 
to gross national product. 
In  group  2),  which  is numerically  very large, 
the  share  of  agriculture  in  GNP  typically 
decreases  and  the share of industry increases. 
The  proportion of  agricultural employment in 
total employment is still high. 
In  the  centrally planned communist economies 
(group  3)  industry makes  a  considerable con-
tribution  to  GNP,  while  other  sectors,  like 
commerce  and  services in  general, contribute 
much  less.  In  nearly every case, more than 
half the  working population is still engaged in 
agriculture. 
In group 4), developed agricultural export co  un-
tries,  agriculture•  s  share in GNP is quite con-
siderably smaller than in the centrally planned 
economies.  In  the  course  of  economie 
development,  agriculture gradually  receded in 
relation  to industry.  In Argentina, where sorne 
25  per  cent  of  the  labour  force  are  still 
occupied  in  agriculture, agriculture and manu-
faL.turing  industry  contribute  equal  shares of 
22 per cent to GNP. 
Lastly,  in  the  developed  industrial  co  un tries 
(group  5)  agriculture is clearly eclipsed both 
as regards its share in GNP and its proportion 
of  employment.  The process of contraction is 
likely  to  continue  apace  in  many  of  these 
countries,  without  necessarily  reducing agri-
cultural output as such - a proviso which applies 
also to group 4). 
From  the  point of view of both the origin of the 
national  product  and  the  composition  of  the 
working population,  the  relative  importance of 
agriculture sharply decreases throughout groups 
2) to 5) from each  step  to  the  next in ascending 
or  der.  Any  given  increase or decrease in the 
value of agricultural output is bound, therefore, 
to  have  a much stronger impact on the national 
income  of  developing  and  centrally  planned 
countries  than  on  that of  deve'loped  countries. 
The  developing  countries  of  groups  1)  and  2) 
generally sell only small quantities and a small 
range  of  products  other  than  those  of  their 
monocultural  farming,  and  the  proportion  of 
their  agricultural  exports  to  total  exports is 
relatively high. 
For the  centrally planned  economies (group 3) 
we  lack  comparable  figures.  The  value  of THE  POSITION  OF AGRICULTURE IN  THE  ECONOMY OF SELECTED COUNTR/ES 
IN  THE  FIVE  GROUPS (1959-1960} 
{in%) 
Contribution to gross national product by  Ratio of agricultural 
Group and country 
1. Tan gan  yi  ka 
2. Thailand 
Co lombia 
ln  dia 
3. Yugoslavia 
Hungary 
Soviet Union 
4. Argentina 
New Zealand 
5. France 
Canada 
German  y  (F. R.) 
United States 
{1)  Including mining, building and power. 
{2)  1956. 
e>  lncluding mining. 
(4)  Estimated from  national statistics 1946-1954. 
Agriculture 
59 
36 
36 
48 
26 
23 
21 
22 
22 
10 
7 
7 
4 
to  total employment 
Manufacturing industry 
7  80-90 
14  84 
16  -
17  (1)  74 (2) 
44 (3)  -
57  (3)  58 
53 (3)  48 
22  25 (4) 
22  -
37  23 
26 (1)  17 (4) 
39  14 
30  8 
Source: Calculated from  national statistics and UN: Statistical Yearbook 1961, New York 1961. 
Yugoslavia'  s  agricultural exports  was  US  ~210 
million  and  accounted for  47  per cent of total 
exports. 
The  characteristic feature  of  developed agri-
cul<.:ural exporters (group 4)  is that their exports 
consist  almost  exclusively  #  or  at  any  rate 
overwhelmingly, of agricultural products. 
As  regards  developed  industrial  countries 
(group  5)  finally  #  agricultural products account 
for  a  smaller  share  of  total  exports  than  in 
any  other group.  It is worth noting, however, 
that  the  export  share  of  agriculture  varies 
greatly from  one country to another; for North 
America  the  figure  is  26  per  cent  (without 
forestry)  and  represents enormous quantities 
in absolute terms. 
3. CONCLUSION:  THERE  EXISTS  A  STRUCTURAL  lM-
BALANCE 
Developing  countries  with  a  static  economy 
(group  1)  hardly participate in  world tracte  of 
most  products.  Developing  countries with  a 
dynamic eco  no my (group 2), wh ile in sorne cases 
exporting  considerable  amounts  of agricultural 
commodities (raw  materials), possess neither 
the  foreign  exchange  nor  the  infrastructures 
which  might  enable  them  to  meet their food 
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requirements by imports.  The centrally planned 
communist  countries  (group  3)  possess both, 
but  prefer  for  reasons  of  economie policy  to 
cover only part of  their food  import require-
ments.  Developed agricultural export countries 
(group 4)  have  no  net import demand for most 
products.  Developed  industrial  countries 
(group  5)  do  possess enough  foreign  exchange 
and  suitable  infrastructures  to  maintain  or 
expand  imports,  but  prefer  for  a  variety of 
reasons to  let their own  agriculture  cover  a 
growing portion of their demand for food. 
Those  countries in  group 2)  which export food, 
have  to do  so even to the detriment of domestic 
supply, be  cause in the interests of the  ir  economie 
development,  they  cannot afford  to  do  without 
the  corresponding  foreign  exchange earnings. 
The same applies to those countries in group 3) 
which  export food.  In  their turn, the countries 
of  group  4)  have  to promote their food exports 
in  order  to  forward  an  improvement  in  their 
standard of  living as well  as  industrialization 
In  spite of  the  relatively  small  importance  of 
agriculture  for  the _  domestic  economy  of  the 
countries  in  group  5)  - the  importance  of 
agriculture decreases  with  advancing develdp-
ment - the  developed industrial  countries are 
likely  to  try  and  expand  their  food  exports. THE  EXPORT SHARE  OF AGRICULTURE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
OF  THE  FIVE  GROUPS (1960} 
Group and Country  Food experts  Other agricultural  Total agricultural  Ratio of agricultural 
experts  experts  to  total exports 
1. Tanganyika  51 
2.  Thailand  192 
Co lombia  346 
lndia  433 
3.- -
4. Argentina  736 
New Zealand  461 
5. Canada  1022 
France  910 
Germany (F  .R.)  239 
United States  3 319 
Source: From FAO: Trade Yearbook 1960, Rome 1961. 
Taking an the five  groups of countries, there-
fore,  there is an imbalance between supply and 
demand,  and  this  imbalance is largely condi-
tioned by structural differences in the countries' 
stage of development and their production plans 
and  foreign  trade.  Viewed  as  a  whole,  the 
resulting market tendencies  are  such that the 
imbalance  must  be  expected  to  grow  in  the 
future rather than to diminish. 
Il.  ANALYSIS  BY  COMMODITIES 
1. THE  CHOICE  OF FOOD  PRO  DU CTS FOR INVESTIGATION 
If  world  trade  agricultural commodities as a 
whole  is out of  balance, there are also  equi-
librating elements which  tend  to  narrow down 
the  gap  between  demand and supply in the case 
of  certain individual products.  These elements 
are  not  the  same  in  every  case,  because 
different  groups  of  countries  supply  any  one 
commodity  to  the  world market or demand it, 
and  because the  elasticities of  production  and 
consumption  vary from  one  commodity  to  the 
other. 
In  investigating  the markets for separate com-
modities,  we  shaH  limit  ourselves  to  food 
products,  and  more particularly to tho se which 
are  now  in·  the  limelight of  international dis-
cussion : grains,  beef  and veal, dairy produce 
sugar, and edible fats and oils. 
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million dollars  % 
78  129  84 
150  342  85 
15  361  78 
151  584  44 
- - -
285  1021  95 
335  796  96 
155  1177  36 
228  1138  19 
llO  349  4 
1627  4946  26 
In  terms  of  value,  the  commodities  under 
consideration together  account for  the  biggest 
single  item  in  world  agricultural  trade,  as 
shown in the table below. 
VALUE  OF  WORLD  AGRICULTURAL  TRADE, 
ANNUAL AVERAGE 1957-1959 
(US 1  '000 million) 
Food 
Commodities under consideration 
Citrus and other fruit 
Tropical beverages, wine, tobacco 
Agricultural raw materials 
Forest products 
Total agricultural products 
11 
1 
5 
5 
5 
27 
Source:  Compiled  from  FAO:  Agricultural Commodities Projec• 
tions for 1970, Rome  1962. 
Generally  speaking, world trade in agricultural 
products accounts for only a relatively low pro-
portion of world output of them. The commodities 
under  consideration - especially grains, dairy 
produce,  and  beef  and  veal  are  not  highly 
"tracte-intensive";  much larger proportions of world output  are  exported  in  the case of other 
agricultural commodities.  For example, about 
70  per cent of  aU  tropical beverages produced 
enter world  tracte,  and  so do  more than 70 per 
cent of many agricultural raw materials. 
RATIO OF  WORLD  EXPORTS  TO  WORLD 
PRODUCTION,  1957-1959 
Sugar  33 
Edible fats and oils  32 
Grains  10 
Dairy produce  7 
Beef and Veal  4 
(in%) 
--------------···--------------· 
Source: Calculated from FAO: Agricultural Commodities Projec• 
tions for 1970, Rome 1962. 
Different  commodities  play  a  different  part 
in  the  tracte  between  particular  groups  of 
countries.  ln  sorne  cases, like grains,  beef 
and  veal,  and  dairy  produce,  tracte  flows  are 
largely  between  developed  countries (groups 4 
and  5);  an  example  to  the  contrary is rice, 
which  is  traded  overwhelmingly / among  de-
veloping  countries (group  2).  Edible fats  and 
oils of animal and vegetable origin are supplied 
by  practically  ail  groups  of  countries,  but the 
main  buyers are industrial countries (group 5). 
It is only in the case of sugar that the bulk of the 
tracte  flows  goes  from  developing  countries 
(group  2)  to  industrial  countries  (group  5). 
2. REVIEW  OF SEPARATE PRODUCTS 
The following brief review of the world markets 
for  grains,  beef  and  veal,  dairy  produce, 
sugar  and  edible fats  and  oils is not meant as 
a  full-scale  analysis.  Past trends, the current 
situation  and prospects of tracte in agricultural 
commodities  are  today  am  ply  documented; 
special  reference  is made  to  F AO's  analysis 
in  Agricultural  Commodities - Projections for 
1970  (Rome 1962,  E/CN.l3/48,  CCP  62/5).  In 
the  present  context we  shall merely draw on 
the  existing documentation  to  outline  the situ-
ation  on  particular  commodity  markets,  with 
special  reference  to  differentiai  tendencies 
with respect to market imbalance. 
Grains  - Volume  of world  trade  1961:  80  million 
tons 
Exporting countries of  group  5)  account for 65 
per cent of world tracte.  Their output has been 
expanding  quite extraordinarily for many years 
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past,  thanks  to  technological improvements, to 
production  incentives  during and after the war, 
and  to  the  production-raising  effects of  agri-
cultural  subsidies.  In  the  other  groups  of 
countries output has  also  been rising steadily. 
This  applies  especially  to  many  countries  of 
group 2), where natural conditions are propitious 
and  great  efforts  are  being  made  toward  a 
rapid increal3e in production, though in absolute 
terms  the  level  of  output  is often  still very 
low. 
Demand  has been stationary in developed coun-
tries,  in spite of the growth of their population. 
In  the future,  much  will  depend  upon  the con-
sumption  of  feed  grains for  the  production of 
animal products. In developing countries demand 
has  been  exp  an ding  continuously,  but  very un-
evenly  and  from  a  very  low  level  of  con-
sumption. 
Looking  at  the  world market for  grains  as  a 
who le,  it  may  be  said  th  at  for  sorne  years 
past output  has  been  in  excess of  demand and 
has  been  exp  an  ding  much more th  an the latter. 
The  result  was  an  enormous  accumulation  of 
stocks, which has long exceeded any reasonable 
limit.  Under  the pressure of  growing stocks, 
artificial  deviees  have  been introduced to pro-
mate  the  non-commercial utilization of grains. 
In  future  years,  severa!  equilibrating factors 
may come into play.  Foremost among them are 
certain restrictions on production in developed 
countries of  group 5), growing demand for feed 
grains in  developed  countries of groups 4)  and 
5),  and  expanding  consumption  in·  developing 
countries  of  group 2).  Centrally planned eco-
nomies  of  group  3)  have  not  been  taking  an 
important part in  world  trade  in grains.  The 
Peoples'  Republic  of  China has been importing 
sizeable  quantities,  but  in  view  of  the  shift 
of emphasis to dornes  tic agricultural production 
these imports  can hardly  be  expected to  con-
tinue  in  the future.  Long-term projections for 
other  countries  in  this  group,  and  especially 
for  the  USSR,  suggest  that their demand for 
grains  will  expand,  and  they  may therefore be 
expected  - though  not  with  certainty  - to 
expand also their grain imports. 
Given the existing imbalance between supply and 
demand, the effectiveness of these equilibrating 
factors  must, however, be regarded as limited. 
Non-commercial grain deliveries  amounted  to 
22  million  tons  in  1961  and  so  accounted for 
about one third of world tracte; this has created 
an  entirely  new  situation  as  regards the com-
position  of  exports  on  commercial  and  non-
commercial  terms.  Any  reduction  in  the 
non-commercial disposai of grains would accen-
tua  te world market imbalance. Among  commercial b'uyers major importera or 
groups  of  importers  took  up  the  following 
absolute and relative quantities in 1961  : 
EEC 
UK 
Japan 
14.9  m.  tons  20%  of  world exports 
9.3  m.  tons  =  13%  of  world exports 
4.4  m.  tons  =  6%  of  world exports 
The United Kingdom and Japan have only limited 
possibilities of  replacing imports  by domestic 
production.  The  United  Kingdom  entertains 
special political and commercial relations with 
its principal suppliers. The EEC's grain imports 
are  subject  to  wide  fluctuations,  given  the 
relatively  high  degree of  self-sufficiency  and 
the  looser political  and  commercial ties with 
certain  other  exporting  countries.  It is not 
precluded  that  in  the  future  a  contraction of 
net  wheat  imports  due  to  growing self-suffi-
ciency  might  be  made  good  by  expanding  im-
ports of fe~d grains. 
Non-commercial exports  during the same year 
amounted  to  22  million  tons,  distributed  as 
follows among major importers (the percentage 
figures  refer  to  the  total  of non-commercial 
exports) : 
Group of countries  3)  2.1  million tons  =  9.5% 
(e.g. Poland, Yugoslavia) 
Mediterranean  countries  4.5  million  tons  = 
20.5% (excl. Yugoslavia) 
Asia 7. 7 million tons  =  35% 
Latin America 3.8 million tons  = 17.3% 
Africa  south of the  Sahara  O. 7  million tons  == 
3.2% 
Bee f  and  veal - Volume  of world trade  1961:  3.5 
million  cattle  and 1  million  tons  of beef and veal 
Developed  countries produce  and  consume two 
thirds  of  ali  meat;  the  remaining  third  is 
attributable to developing countries, which have 
roughly  two  thirds  of  the  world's population. 
Neither they nor the centrally planned economies 
play more than a negligible part in world trade. 
Only  7  per cent of  world output enters world 
tracte, which is carried on mainly among devel-
oped  countries.  In  the  case of  beef  and veal, 
developed  countries  of  group  5)  account  for 
66 per cent of world tracte. 
The  principal  suppliers  are  Argentina  and 
Uruguay.  Sin  ce  the  war  Oceania  has  been 
supplying  growing  quantities  of  meat,  and  so 
have  certain European countries like Denmark, 
Ireland,  the  Netherlands,  Yugoslavia  and  -
more  recently  - France.  The principal im-
porters  are  Western  European  countries, 
among which the United Kingdom alone accounts 
for  nearly half of  total  world  imports.  Unlike 
their gross imports, net imports of the United 
States are very small. 
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At  present,  the  world  market  for  beef  and 
veal  displays  no  structural oversupply.  Should 
a  vigorous  expansion  of  production  lead  to 
excess supply in the future, equilibrium between 
supply  and  demand  could  no  doubt  be  re-
established- by  priee  changes,  given  the  high 
priee  elasticity  of  demand for  beef  and veal. 
World trade will continue to be largely between 
developed countries of groups 4)  and 5).  There 
is  sorne  prospect that centrally planned eco-
nomies  (group  3)  may  import  more,  but 
developing  countries  of  groups  1)  and  2)  will 
continue  for  sorne  years  to  take  little  part 
in world trade. 
All  this  adds  up  to  a relatively stable market, 
from  which  the  developing  countries  are,  to 
aU  intents  and  purposes,  absent.  Radical 
changes  are,  however,  not  to  be  excluded on 
the  supply  si  de,  if  Oceania  should exploit its 
rich  production  potential  and  France  and  the 
Netherlands  raise their supply within the EEC. 
In  the  United  States,  too,  the  situation  may 
change  in  the  direction  of  growing  domestic 
production,  especially  if priees rise.  On  the 
demand  side  the  determinant  factor  is  the 
attitude  of  the  United  Kingdom.  Any  change 
in  its traditional  sources of  imports,  such as 
was  discussed  during  the  negotiations  on 
Britain's  entry into  the  EEC,  would  alter the 
market situation. 
Dairy . produce  - Volume  of  world  trade  1961 : 
2.2 million tons (dairy produce} 
Exporters of  group  5)  alone account for 67 per 
cent of  wprld tracte  in  dçiiry  produce.  Gener-
ally  speaking,  supply  is  characterized  by 
steadily  expand~ng  output.  The  production-
raising  effects  of  agricultural  subsidies  are 
especially  marked  in  the  case of  dairy pro-
duce,  and  many  countries  also  apply  export 
subsidies on a large scale. 
On  the  demand  side,  the  main  feature  is  a 
relatively  high  per  caput  consumption  in 
developed  countries, where no  major expansion 
of  consurnption  can  be  expected.  Priee re-
ductions  might  stimulate  butter  consumption 
in countries with large margarine consumption. 
For  the  rest,  the  priee elasticity of  demand 
for  dairy produce  is  rather  low.  Milk  con-
sumption,  which  accounts  for  30-40 per cent 
of  total  consumption  of  dairy  produce,  can 
hardly  be  expected to grow to any considerable 
extent.  Developing  countries  remain largely 
excluded from  world trade,  and  sin  ce in many 
of  them  domestic  production has  been rising 
more  slowly  than population,  consumption per 
head has be  en falling further. All  in  all  the  world market for  dairy produce 
is  marked  by  strong  oversupply.  Developed 
countries are surrounded by protectionist tariff 
walls  and  their  consumers  pay  artificially 
high priees.  World market priees, by contrast, 
have  fallen  and  often  fail  to  cover the  costs 
of  the  che~pest sellers.  A  strong increase ïn 
oversupply on  this market is expected for the 
future.  Large  amounts  of  dairy  produce are 
included  in  non-commercial surplus utilization 
There  is  no  expectation  that  demand  ort  the 
part  of  centrally  planned  economies  can  do 
anything  rn uch  to  mitigate  the  growing  fm-
balance on the world market for dairy  produce 
in  the  future.  These  countries  will  remain 
marginal importers for years to  come.  Sorne 
of  them  may  expand their butter imports,  but 
others, like Poland, will maintain their exports. 
Sugar  - Volume  of world  trade  1961:  18  million 
tons  (raw  sugar} 
During  the  last  ten years  sugar output more 
than  doubled, even though the traditional export 
countries,  especially  Cuba,  have  not  as  yet 
exploited their potential for higher production. 
The  outlook  for  the  future  is that  developed 
countries  cannot  step  up  their  output  much 
more, while  considerable increases are to  be 
expected  in  developing  countries,  especially 
in Latin America. 
Total  demand bas been rising sharply in recent 
years.  Industrial  countries  (group  5)  have 
clearly reached  saturation point,  while  devel-
oping  countries  of  group  2)  expanded  their 
consumption  along  with  their  domestic  pro-
duction.  Until 1960 centrally planned economies 
played  an  insignificant  part  in  world  tracte; 
on  balance,  they  bad  negligible  net  exports. 
In  1961,  however,  these  countries  purchased 
4. 7  million  tons  from  Cuba,  th  us  absorbing 
77  per  cent  of  its  exports.  Even  though the 
Eastern countries eventually  re-exported part 
of  these  imports,  the  example  is  instructive, 
in  that  it  shows  what  a  difference  these 
countries  can  make  to  the  market situation, 
if  they  allow  their potential demand and inter-
national  purchasing  power  to  enter the  world 
market. 
The  sizeable oversupply  which  was  the deter-
mining  feature  of  the  world  market situation 
for  sorne  time,  gave  way  in  the  last  two 
years  to  a  general  shortage  of  supply.  The 
main  reason  of  this  reversai  of  fortunes is 
the  political  situation of  Cuba.  Not  only  has 
Cuba' s  output  fallen considerably, but bilateral 
agreements  with  the  USSR  and  other Eastern 
countries  will  prevent,  or  at  least  sharply 
diminish, Cuban supplies to the world market-
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the more so since these countries would actually 
appear  to  have  become  deficit  areas  them-
selves. 
In  the  immediate  future  the  market must be 
expected to rem  ain tight, un til rising  production 
elsewhere evens out the situation. 
Edible fats  and ails - Volume of world trade  1961: 
8. 7 million tons (fat content} 
Edible fats  and  oils, too,  have for sorne years 
now  been  registering  steady  production  in-
creases,  especially  in  the  United  States  and 
also in  many  developing  countries.  Expansion 
of  output  was  especially  vigorous  during  th~ 
war  and  the  Korea  cr  isis,  and  affected  in 
particular animal fats and oils, the by-products 
tallow,  fish  oil,  soya be  an  oil  and  cottonseed 
oil,  and  peanut  oil.  Consumption  bas  been 
rising  at  almost  the  same  pace,  and  this is 
all  the  more  remarkable  as  a  large part of 
fat  consumption, which used  to  go to  the  soap 
industry,  bas  now  be  en replaced by synthetics. 
In  many  countries - including especially India, 
Indonesia  and  Argentina  - growing domestic 
consumption  made  inroads  into  their exports. 
In dia,  a  traditional exporter, bas now  become 
a net importer. 
The  proportion  of  by-products  traded  inter-
nationally bas been  growing  appreciably  since 
about  1953,  and  the  share  of  the  developing 
countries  in  international  tracte  bas  fallen 
considerably.  These  developments were ac-
companied by remarkable priee stability, except 
for  sorne passing periods of  sharp fluctuation 
and  a  marked  trend  of  a  faU  in  priees for 
edible  oils  (soya  bean  oil,  peanut  oil)  and 
by-products. 
Among  the  communist planned  economies the 
Peoples'  Republic  of  China,  which  bad at first 
exported large  quantities  despite  the very low 
per  caput  consumption  at  home,  was  notable 
for  the  considerable  reduction  in  the scale of 
its  sales  abroad.  The  group  as  a  whole was 
a  net importer,  though  the  quantities involved 
were smaU. 
In  comparison with other agricultural commod-
ities,  the  fats  and oils  market is, therefore, 
rather  well  balanced,  even  though  the  outlook 
is none too good for certain are  as and products. 
In  industrial  countries, consumption per head 
is stationary,  while output will increase vigor-
ously,  especially  in  the  United States.  On  the 
other  band,  demand is expected  to  expand  so 
much  elsewhere  (except  in  group  3),  that  in 
the  aggregate  no  oversupply  need be  feared. 
The  major  uncertainty  is  wh ether,  and  to 
what  extent,  the  growing  demand  of  groups  2) 
and  3)  will  be  directed  to  the  world market or covered by  domestic production,  to  expand 
which  these  countries  are willing to pay rising 
costs.  In  this  connection it should  be  noted 
that  there  are  large  surplus  stocks  in  the 
US  and  that  considerable quantities (especially 
of  soy  beans)  have  been  exported  on  non-
commercial terms since 1955. 
3. CONCLUSION  : EQUILIBRIUM  IS  NOT  IN  SIGHT 
To  sum  up,  it  may  be  said  that,  although 
certain  equilibrating  elements  tend to  reduce 
the  imbalance  between  supply  and  demand on 
the  world  markets  for  the  commodities here 
under  consideration,  the  effects  are  far  too 
weak  to  establish equilibrium  on  any  of  these 
markets, let alone all of them. 
Where  imbalances do  tend  to  diminish, it can 
be se  en from the existence of supply management 
in  different  forms,  as  well  as  from  non-
commercial transactions, that the equilibrating 
effects  by  no  means originate in market forces 
alone, but owe much to government intervention. 
Furthermore,  the  priee  elasticity  of  demand 
is low  in  most markets,  so that an adjustment 
of  supply  and  demand  through  the  priee 
mechanism  cannot  be  expected.  A  further 
point  to  note  is  that in  a  growing number of 
countries  the  elasticity  of  demand  will  tend 
to fall as income grows. 
Lastly,  it must be  stressed that in  this brief 
review  no  allowance  has  been  made  for  the 
interdependence  of  markets.  But interdepend-
ence  means  that  any  approach  to  equilibrium 
on  the  market  for  one  commodity  may  be 
wiped  out  by  disequilibrium or changes on the 
markets for  other commodities.  This applies 
no  less  to  products  within  the  broad groups 
of  grains,  meat,  dairy  produce  and  edible 
fats  and  oils,  than  to  the  relationships  of 
the  se  groups  of  commodities  to  each  other. 
A  case  in  point  is  the  cheap  production  of 
eggs  and  their  world  market  supply,  thanks 
to non-commercial importa of grains. 
Taking  all  the  commodities  here  considered 
as  a  who le,  the  conclusion  cannot be  evaded 
that  the  market  tendencies  in  evidence  hold 
out  no  hope  of  adequate  market  equilibrium 
either now  or for sorne years to come.  On  the 
contrary, the observer is struck by the abundance 
and variety of tendencies which cause or accen-
tuate market imbalances. 
Ill. THE  IMBALANCE  ON  THE  WORLD  MARKET 
FOR  A  GR/CULTURAL  COMMODITIES 
The foregoing  analysis  by  groups  of countries 
and  by  commodities  has  shown  that  in  the 
current  relationships  between  agricultural 
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markets  there is an imbalance between demand 
and  supply,  in  the  case of  all  the  major food 
products  and  all the five  groups of  countries. 
Careful examination would reve  al sim  il  ar strong 
imbalances  between  demand  and  supply  with 
respect to other foodstuffs and agricultural raw 
materials. 
The  origins of  this  disequilibr  lum  go  back to 
the  first  world war  and the  subsequent agri-
cultural  criais.  Ever  since,  the  causes  of 
imbalance  have  been  closely  linked  to  the 
critical  problems  of  agriculture'  s  part  in 
economie development. 
Before discussing how an organization of world 
agricultural markets might remove the existing 
imbalance, it will be well to de  scribe the latter'  s 
elements. 
1. SURPLUSES AND  PRICE DISTORTIONS 
a} Surplus es 
Given  normal  stocks,  we  define  as  surplus 
tho  se quantities of any country'  s products which 
neither  domestic nor foreign  demand takes up 
at the  domestic  supply priee.  To arrive at an 
idea of  the  real extent of  surpluses, we must, 
therefore, add to the unsold carryover from the 
old crop year also such non-commercial dispos  al 
as may have taken place.  Given the multiplicity 
of methods applied to influence the market, it is 
extremely difficult to  determine what  the size 
of  surpluses would  be  in  the absence of inter-
vention. 
This circumstance has to be kept in mind when 
we  now  look at the considerable surplus stocks 
which have been accumulating for years in sorne 
countries,  notably in the United States, but also 
in Canada, Argentina and Australia.  Carryover 
stocks  of  wheat  and  coarse grains give  sorne 
idea  of  surplus  supply  of  these  commoditi~s. 
So  far,  surpluses have  emerged mainly  in the 
case  of  storable foodstuffs,  including  in par-
ticular  grains,  and  of  a  few  agricultural raw 
materials, like cotton. 
Storage  and  administration costs  in the United 
States  are  said to  exceed one  million dollars 
per  day.  In  1962,  total  wheat  surplus  stocks 
amounted  to almost 18 per cent of world output. 
According to the classical rules of competition, 
a drastic priee reduction, followed by expansion 
of  demand  and  contraction  of  output,  should 
remove  the  surpluses.  But in  actual fact  the 
priees of many commodities are falling without 
correspondingly stimula  ting demand or discour-
aging prqduction.  The most diverse factors are 
responsible  for  this,  including,  for  example, CARRYOVER STOCKS OF WHEAT AND COARSE  GRAINS AT THE 
BEGINNING OF  THE  NEW SEASON 
(in million tons) 
Country  Commodity  1957/1958  1960/1961  1961/1962  1962/1963 
United States  Wheat  24.7  35.8  38.4  35.5 
Coarse grains  44.4  68.0  77.0  65.4 
Canada  Wheat  19.9  16.3  16.5  10.6 
Coarse grains  6.6  4.6  4.5  2.8 
Argent  ina  Wheat  1.6  1.2  0.8  0.2 
Australia  Wheat  1.1  1.7  0.7  0.5 
Source: From FAO: The State of Food and Agriculture 1963, Rome 1963. 
low  priee  elasticity  of  demand  or  the  far-
reaching  insulation  of  agricultural production 
from market developments. 
In  all  cases,  the pressure of  growing  stocks 
has  proved  a  coercive  element in fashioning 
the  behaviour  of  surplus  countries.  This 
applies  also  to  non-commercial  surplus  utili-
zation.  Sorne  surplus countries even  adopted 
agricultural policy measures which stimulated 
production alongside with growing surplus utili-
zation,  so  that  oversupply increased further. 
Finally, surpluses of sever  al agricultural com-
modities  undeniably  threaten  to  develop  in 
Western  Europe  within  the  next  few  years. 
Agricultural  surpluses thus  become a problem 
typical  of  the  market Situation  of  most, or at 
any  rate  of  the  most important,  countries  of 
groups 4)  and 5). 
b) Priee distortions 
Agricultural  protectionism  creates  domestic 
capacities which  often produce  at much higher 
costs than  major  and  cost-favoured sellers on 
the  world  market  and  which  raise  domestic 
supply  beyond  domestic  demand.  Export sub-
sidies channel part of  the  supply  to  the world 
market,  where it is sold· at arbitrary  p~ices. 
Demand con  tracts as major importing countries 
become  more  self-sufficient  and  at  the  same 
time the pressure of supply increases in many 
countries under the impact of export subsidies ; 
the  result is considerable priee distortion on 
the  market.  Often enough priees faU below the 
costs of the cheapest suppliera. 
The  situation  is  indeed  paradoxical : agri-
cultural  commodities  are  produced  with  the 
help  of  subsidies,  and  further  subsidies  are 
then  needed  to  export  part  of  these  same 
commodities.  We  are face  to face, here, with 
an  essential  element  of  the  imbalance  from 
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which  world agricultural markets suffer; while 
it affects primarily the  developed countries of 
groups  4)  and  5),  it  is  present  in  all o~her 
groups  of  countries  as  well.  Sales  on  the 
world market are no  longer determined solely 
by  comparative  costs,  but  also  by  the  ability 
and willingness of  exporting countries to sub-
sidize their exports. 
Sorne ide  a of the extent of priee distortion may be 
gained from  a  comparison  of  domestic priees 
in major importing or exporting countries and 
the world market priee. 
By  comparison,  world  market priees for  the 
most important qualities (cif  AntwerpjRotter-
dam)  were  on  the  average  as follows  between 
August 1962  and December 1963 (US  ~ per ton) : 
Wheat 
Bar  ley 
64-70 
56 
Oats 
Maize 
60 
58-64 
There  is  a  striking difference  between  world 
market  priees  and  the  domestic  priees  of 
industrial  importing  countries  which  practice 
agricultural  protection.  Nowadays,  the priees 
of  most commodities (accounting for 85-90 per 
cent  of  world  production)  are  subsidized  by 
government  and there is a discrepancy between 
the  guaranteed domestic  and  the world market 
priee  on  the  majority  of  produce  markets. 
2. FOOD  DEFICIT  AND  DEFICIENT  DEMAND  FOR  FOOD 
a) The food deficit 
In spite of the existence of surpluses, more than 
half  the  world's population  suffers from  mal-
nutrition or undernutrition.  Measured against a 
minimum  standard  of  2 550  to  2 650  calories 
per  person  per  day,  the  situation  bef  ore the 
war,  as  described by  the  F AO  in  World  Food 
Survey  (Rome,  1964),  was  that  in  areas con-GUARANTEED DOMESTIC  PRODUCER  PRICES,  1963 
A. 
Exporting Countries 
United States (1 ) 
Canada (2 ) 
Argentina (3) 
Australia ( 4 ) 
France (5 ) 
B. 
lmporting Countries 
Germany (F.R.) (5) 
Ital  y 
Netherlands (6) 
United Kingd,Qm  (4 ) 
Denmark (7)  · 
{1)  National average support priee. 
(2}  Initial payments. 
(3)  Support priee. 
{4)  Guaranteed priee. 
Wheat  Feed barley 
67  44 
51  42 
55  37 
59  -
92  74 
Wheat  Feed barley 
111  95 
102 (5)  71  (6) 
98  81 
73  74 
71  67 
(in  US  1 per ton) 
Mai te  Oats 
49  45 
- 38 
40  33 
- -
81  -
(in US  1 per ton) 
Maize  Oats 
- -
68  (6)  -
- -
- 76 
- 63 
{5)  Derived target priees. Main surplus area. Beginning of the crop year. 
{6)  Target priee. Beginning of the crop year. 
{7)  For wheat: minimum priee. For barley and oats: base priee. 
Source: From EEC: Marchés agricoles -Prix, Direction générale de l'agriculture, Brussels. 
taining  over  half  the  world'  s  population,  food 
consumption  was  well  below  the  minimum;  in 
areas  containing  somewhat less than a third of 
world'  s  population,  food  consumption  was well 
in  excess  of  the  minimum;  in  the  remaining 
areas,  containing about one sixth of the world's 
population,  food  consumption  was  close  to  the 
minimum.  After  the  war, the food situation of 
the world's  peoples was  worse  still,  and  only 
sorne  of  them  have  so far regained the ground 
they  had  lost.  According  to  F AO's  latest 
figures  (Third World  Food Survey, Rome 1963) 
the  situation  has  not yet radically  improved. 
Developing  countries  have  barely  managed to 
return to their inadequate pre-war consumption 
levels;  sorne  20  per cent of  their populations 
are  undernourished  today,  and  sorne  60  per 
cent  live  on  diets  which  are  inadequate  in 
nutritional quality. 
Food needs  will  grow very much in the future. 
Assuming no  more than  a  constant nutritional 
standard, that is, no improvement in the existing 
level  of  diet,  FAO  calculates that population 
increases  alone  would  caU  for food  supplies 
in  developing  countries  to  rise by  41  per cent 
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between  1958  (=100)  and 1975.  Postulating  an 
annual  increase  of  2.3 per cent in per caput 
food  supplies,  requirements  in  1975  would  be 
as shown in the table below. 
INDEX NUMBERS OF NEEDS IN TOTAL  FOOD 
SUPPLIES BY 1975 
Low-calorie countries 
World 
Total food 
179 
151 
(1958  = lOO) 
Animal food 
221 
158 
Source: From FAO: Third World Food Survey, Rome 1963. 
The number of calories consumed is no sufficient 
indication of the world food problem.  The die  t'  s 
content of vegetable  and  animal proteins is of 
the essence.  Different estimates put the normal 
daily  intake  of  proteins  at  65  to 80 grams per 
person, of which 7 to 40 grams of animal origin. 
But most co  un tries suffer from a lack of proteins, 
and especially animal proteins. Apart ~from the products of fishery and hunting, 
animal  products  are  derived  from  plant 
products.  A  great many primary calories of 
vegetable  origin  go  to  make  up  one secondary 
calorie of animal origin.  If food consumption in 
low-calorie  and  in  high-calorie  countries  is 
expressed  in  the  common  denominator  of 
primary  calories consumed directly  and  used 
for  the  production  of  animal  foods,  primary 
calorie  consumption  in  the  two  groups  of 
countries is seen to differ very greatly. 
Apart from  the  "fuels"  measured in terms of 
calories,  the  human body needs other essential 
substances,  such  as  minerals, vitamins, etc. 
Their  shortfall  together  with  the  deficit  in 
primary  and  secondary  calories,  adds  up  to 
the food  deficit.  The food  deficit varies con-
siderably  not  only from  one  are  a  to  another  a 
but  over  time.  It may  happen that alternating 
periods  of  hunger  and  of  transitory abundance 
add  up  to  average figures  of " sufficient" food 
supply  in  the  calculation  of  any  area's food 
balance. 
The  nutritional standard of a people is made up 
of  a  number  of  components,  nam  ely,  calorie 
consumption  with  due  regard  to  proteins  of 
vegetable  and  animal  origin,  the  degree  to 
which  the  diet  is  balanced from  the  point of 
view of the supply of vital substances, regularity 
of  food  supply,  and  finally  the  adaptation of 
food  supply  to  special  needs  and  living  con-
ditions  (infants,  tropical  areas, etc.).  If any 
one  of  these  components falls  short of  phys-
iological  norms,  it may  impair  the nutritional 
standard as  a  whole  and  imply  a  food  deficit. 
Bec  a use it is difficult to define adequate nutrition 
in  terms  of  physiological  indicators  and  to 
quantify  the  real  nutritional  level,  the  food 
deficit is generally measured  solely  in  terms 
of  lacking  calories (and vital substances) even 
though  as  a  rule it encompasses  much more. 
To  sum  up,  the  conclusion  cannot be evaded 
that  the  physiological food  needs  of  the popu-
lations  of  developing  countries  can  today  be 
met  only  in  part by  domestic production  and 
imports.  It  may  well  happen  that even less 
of their needs can be met in the future. 
b) Demand for  food 
Physiological  food  needs  have  to  be  sharply 
distinguished  from  effective food  needs.  The 
latter are determined by  the purchasing power, 
or the  effective  demand, which is exercised on 
the  market.  In  many less developed countrie.s 
only  a  fraction  of  physiological food  needs is 
translated into effective demand. 
The  reasons  for  this  state of  affairs  include 
not  only  the  lack  of  purchasing  power,  but 
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also  inopportune or backward food  habits (in-
cluding  taboos).  Furthermore,  a considerable 
part  of  the  food  consumption  of  countries 
in  groups  1)  and  2)  is covered by  the family 
units' own production.  Ali the  se factors restrict 
effective demand on the domestic market.  What 
little  demand  there  is  in  comparison  with 
physiological  needs  is  kept  away  from  world 
markets  by  shortage of  foreign  exchange  and 
the  priority  accorded  to  industrial  imports. 
As economie development proceeds, households 
consume  less  self-produced  food.  To  the 
extent that incomes per head  and  the  division 
of  labour  grow,  more  demand is directed to 
the  domestic  market,  but  only  part  of  the 
demand expansion is reflected in import demand. 
The  reasons  are  increasing  domestic  agri-
cultural production, even at comparatively high 
.~osts, insufficient communications between local 
markets (infrastructures), priorities for other 
imports, the pur  suit of autarky, etc. 
Nevertheless, a comparison of pre-andpost-war 
figures  shows  that  developing  countries  did 
expand  their  imports  of  grains, for  example, 
and  indeed  expanded them far more ttian might 
have  been expected from  the  relatively  small 
growth of their national income. 
GRAIN IMPORTS OF SOUTH  AMERICA, 
AFRICA  AND  AS/A 
Regions 
South America 
Africa 
Asia 
(Annual averages in million tons} 
1934-1939 
1.3 
0.6 
2.6 
3.5 
3.4 
13.6 
Source:  From  EEC:  Marchés  agricoles -Prix, Direction  géné-
rale de  l'agriculture, Brussels. 
The major importera are Brazil in Latin Amer-
ica,  Egypt  in  Africa,  and  ln  dia,  J a  pan  and 
Pakistan in Asia. 
The fact remains that the countries of groups 1) 
and  2)  exercise  far  less demand for  food  on 
the  world  market  than  would  be  desirable  in 
the  light  of  their  food  deficit.  They  feel 
constrained  to  restrict  their import demand, 
and  in  this respect behave on the world market 
rn uch  like  many  of  the  developed  · countries, 
even  though,  as  we  have  seen in our analysis 
by  groups  of  countries, the latter contain their 
imports  mostly  for  other reasons  and  on  the 
whole  no  longer  suffer from  any  food  deficit. 3. CONCLUSION!  THE  IMBALANCE  IS  WORLD-WIDE 
AU  in  all  we  are  led  to  the  conclusion that 
the  imbalance  on  .  world  agricultural  markets 
affects  the  majority  of  countries.  in  aU  five 
groups.  Structural factors  having  to  do  with 
differences  in  thé  stage of  development of the 
five  groups  of  countries  account for  a  large 
part  of  the  reasons  for  the  imbalance.  The 
situation  differs  considerable  as  between 
different commodities, but no general improve-
ment is in sight; sorne produce markets indeed 
display  a  tendency towards growing imbalance. 
Because of the problematical situation in which 
agriculture  now  finds  itself both  on  domestic 
and world markets, the classical market mech-
anism  is  today  largely  inoperative  in  world 
agricultural  trade.  Priee no longer adequately 
fulfils  its  function  of  adjusting  supply  and 
demand. 
Surpluses, priee distortions, food  deficits  and 
deficiency  of  effective  demand are indications 
of  the  world-wide  extent  of  the  imbalance. 
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The  production-raising  effect  of  agricultural 
subsidies  reduces  the  net  imports  of  many 
developed  countries  and  pushes their domestic 
output  beyond  their domestic demand,  so  that 
surpluses  threaten  to  emerge  in  a  growing 
number  of  countries.  Shares  in  world  trade 
are  no  longer determined by comparative costs 
alone,  but  also  by  the  amount  of  subsidies 
which  governments  are  willing  and  able  to 
impose  on taxpayers.  Subsidies to agricultural 
production  are  followed  by  export  subsidies 
for  part  of  the  output.  As  a  result, priees 
are distorted.  ln  the less developed countries 
only  part,  and  sometimes  a  small  part,  of 
thèir  food  deficit  is  covered.  Their  small 
import demand  is due  to  a variety of reasons, 
including  shortage  of  foreign  exchange  and 
the  domestic  market's lack of  dynamism  and 
communications (infrastructures). 
In  the  course of the years to come, the market 
imbalance  must be expected to increase rather 
than  to  dim~nish.  If things  are  left  to them-
selves,  it  is  likely that growing surpluses will 
go  hand  in  hand  with  a  growing  world  food 
deficit. B.  ORGANIZATION OF WORLD AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 
1  THE  REASONS  FOR  ORGANIZATION 
AND  ITS  PURPOSES 
Imbalance  on  commodity  markets, priee dis-
tortions,  the  coexistence  of food surpluses and 
food  deficit,  and  the  imminent  threat  of  an 
increase  in  the  structurally  conditioned  and 
world-wide  gap  between  supply  and  demand 
have  so  thoroughly  upset  world  agricultural 
trade that  any  isolated measures or any single 
country's  steps  remain  ineffective.  In  these 
circumstances the  question  arises whether in-
ternational action  has  to  be  taken to establish 
a  new  order  in  the  relations  among  world 
agricultural markets. 
Before  attemping an  answer,  a  prior question 
needs  to  be  discussed.  Is  it  not  so that the 
spontaneous  market  mechanisms,  which  nor-
many  tend  to  equate  supply  and  demand,  are 
already invalidated by an sorts  of interventions, 
and  would  not  international  action  with  its 
further  interventions  complicate the  situation 
still  more?  Would  it  not  be  better  just to 
re-establish free competition ? 
The  preceding analysis of  agricultural market 
relations,  in  terms both of groups of countries 
and  of  separate commodities,  and the analysis 
of  the  existing disequilibrium have  shown  the 
depth  and  diverse  origin of  the  contradictions 
and  imbalances which  beset world agricultural 
trade  and  markets.  The immobility of factors 
of  production, the low priee elasticity of supply 
and  demand,  structural  differences  between 
countries  and  the  resulting  opposition  of 
interests  an  go  to  show  that the  world-wide 
imbalance  on  agricultural markets is closely 
linked  with  problems of  economie  growth  and 
with  national  agricultural  policies, which  are 
largely  divorced  from  market  developments. 
It  can but  be  repeated that  it  is not possible, 
in  this  situation,  to  establish completely free 
competition. 
It  fonows  that  sorne  other way  must be  found 
to introduce order into world agricultural mar-
kets.  When  we  speak,  in  this context,  of an 
"organization of  world  agricultural markets ", 
we  do  not,  as has already been stressed in the 
Introduction,  mean that  sorne  institution  is to 
be set up to deal with the  se problems ; .  we  mean 
that  world  agricultural  markets  are  to  be 
organized by means of joint action by economi-
cany  developed  and  less developed  countries, 
on the basis of appropriate agreements. 
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1. THE  REASONS  FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION 
A  first  and  potent  reason  for  international 
action  with  a  view to reorganizing agricultural 
market relations is that all groups of countries 
stand to  gain from an expansion of trade flows. 
This  applies quite particularly to the developed 
industrial  countries  (group 5).  Their  mutual 
trade  in  manufactures  is growing  steadily and 
vigorously;  but  it  has  become  increasingly 
clear, especially since  the  last war,  how  im-
portant  a  bearing agricultural trade has on the 
further  expansion  of  industrial  trade.  The 
recent  history  of  commercial  policy  and 
economie  integration is rich in examples which 
go  to  show  that  the  further development of the 
network  of  industrial  trade  can be  hampered 
for  want  of  sufficient  agricultural exchanges 
in  a measure far exceeding the latters' numer-
ical  importance.  It  would  be  no  exaggeration 
to  say  that  agricultural  trade  excercises  a 
cumulative effect on industrial trade. 
The same is true of the trade relations between 
the  countries  of  group  5)  and  all  the  other 
groups, even though the expansionary effects on 
trade  are naturally rather less  in  the  case of 
agricultural  imports originating in  developing 
countries  with  a  smaller  capacity  to  absorb 
industrial  products.  To  sorne  extent  this 
interdependance  of  agricultural  and  industrial 
trade  is evident also in the trade relations with 
centrally planned  economies  (group  3); inthis 
case  it  remains  to  be  seen whether  sorne  of 
them  will  take  advantage  of  this  cumulative 
trade effect, by allowing their potential demand 
for food to find expression in larger agricultural 
imports,  which  would  enable  them to withdraw 
more productive re  sources from agriculture and 
to  step up their industrial exports.  Developing 
countries  in group 2)  have a particular interest 
in  an intensification of agricultural trade, in so 
far  as  most  of  them  rely  on  agricultural 
commodity  exports  as  the  main  source  of 
foreign exchange. 
Taking  the  commercial interests of  countries 
as  a  whole,  therefore,  there is everything to 
be  said  for  a  reorganization  of  world  agri-
cultural  trade  relations,  even  though  it  may 
be  contemplated  merely  within  the  limited 
scope  of reducing imbalances only to the extent 
required  for  the  desired  expansion  of  world 
trade.  It  must be admitted, in this connection, 
that  imbalance  on  world  agricultural markets 
has  so far grown  continuously without causing 
world  trade  to  stagnate,  let  alone  to  shrink. 
On  the  contrary,  world  trade has kept growing 
at  the  same time  as  imbalance.  This obser-
vation  should  serve  to  dampen,  right  at  the outset,  any  sanguine  hopes  that  reasons  of 
commercial  policy  alone  might  be  enough  to 
remove  disequilibrium from  the  world's agri-
cultural markets. 
Development  polie  y,  in  its  tu  rn,  has  its own 
reasons  for  a  reorganization  of  world  agri-
cultural  markets.  These  reasons  have  to  do 
with  the removal of the food deficit which holds 
back  the  economie  development  of  countries 
in  groups  1)  and  2).  To  mobilize  the demand 
of these  countries would certainly be desirable 
from  the  point  of  view  not  only  of their own 
economie development,  but  also of the existing 
imbalances  on  world  agricultural  markets; 
it  would  not,  however,  do  away  with  the  se 
imbalances,  especially  since  the  developing 
countries  themselves export agricultural com-
modities,  including  sorne  which  are  already 
in strong oversupply.  The reasons which speak 
for  a  reorganization  of  world  agricultural 
markets from  the  point of view of development 
policy  are, furthermore, subject to other limi-
tations,  in  so  far  as  experience  has  shown 
trade  exchange  between  developed  countries 
to be tho  se th  at not only are the most intensive, 
but  that  display  the  fastest  rates of  increase. 
Even  within  the  group  of  centrally  planned 
economies  (group  3)  no  effort  has  so  far 
succeeded  in  intensifying trade  between coun-
tries  at  markedly  different  stages  of 
development. 
The  really compelling  reason for international 
action  to remove disequilibrium on world agri-
cultural markets lies elsewhere  than  in  tracte 
or development  policy.  It  is that  the existing 
imbalance,  that  the  disorder which  reigns  in 
world agricultural trade and has su  ch damaging 
effects on international tracte, are incompatible 
with  any  attempt  to  improve  economie  co-
operation on  a  world  scale.  Since  the second 
world  war,  international  co-operation  has 
transcended  trade  polie  y,  and  more  recently 
also  development  policy,  and  has  spread  and 
intensified  in the wider framework of the world 
economy as a who le.  International co-operation 
today  rests on  political no  less than economie 
motives.  Here  is  the  true  reàson  why  the 
world  is  no  longer  willing to  put  up  with the 
spreading canker of  ahricultural market prob-
lems,  nor  with  the  paradoxical  coexistence 
of  food  surpluses and  hunger.  All  countries, 
whatever the ir political  and  social order,  and 
international  organizations  alike  regard  the 
removal  of  this  state of  affairs  as one  of the 
great  tasks  of  our  time.  It  is  a task which 
necessarily  requires  international  action  to 
establish  a  new  order  on  world  agricultural 
markets. 
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2. THE  PURPOSES OF ORGANIZATION 
What  has  been  said  so  far  already  suggests 
to  what  purposes the  new order - the organ-
ization - of world agricultural markets should 
be directed : it should aim at the disappearance 
of disequilibrium. 
One  purpose  must  be  to remove surpluses and 
to  try and  make  good  the  food  deficit.  At  the 
same  time  priee distortions on world markets 
must  be  eliminated.  Consumption  must  be 
expanded not only in the less developed countries 
of  groups  1)  and  2),  but  also  in the developed 
a'gricultural  export  and  industrial  countries 
(groups  4  and  5).  The  centrally planned eco-
nomies  (group  3)  should  be free  to  take  part 
in the  organization of world agricultural tracte, 
if  they  so de'sire;  the  most  developed  among 
them  have  a  considerable potential of effective 
demand.  Fin  ally,  the  supply  of  agricultural 
commodities,  too,  must be encompassed in the 
new order.  Any  attempt at solvingthe problems 
of world agricultural tracte is doomed to failure 
so  long  as  supply  is  not  adapted to the course 
of  demand,  because  without  that  no  lasting 
market equilibrium is possible. 
11.  THE  KIND  OF  ORGANIZA TION  REQUIRED 
1. INAPPLICABLE SOLUTIONS 
What  kind  of new order (organization) do world 
agricultural markets  need  if we are to achieve 
our objective of removing, or at !east radie  ally 
and  lastingly  reducing, · the  existing imbalance 
between  supply  and  demand ?  To  answer this 
question,  it  will be  necessary to  examine  the 
suitability  of  different  solutions  of  wider or 
lesser scope. 
The  most universal  and,  in  the long run, most 
effective solution would doubtless be the creation 
of  a  political world organization encompassing 
aU the five groups of countries and endowed with 
adequate executive powers. 
This  would  be  possible  only on  condition of  a 
general  relaxation  of  political  tensions,  in-
cluding  the  conflict between  East  and West; it 
would  also  require  world-wide  harmonization 
of  political  interests  along  the  line  of  joint 
solutions to the problems of the world economy. 
Defence  expenditures,  which  now  weigh  so 
heavily  upon  the  budgets  not  alone  of  the 
~eading nations, could then be reduced drastically 
and budgetary re  sources released.  As a result, 
and  as  a  result also  of the  multiple  opportu-
nities  of  joint action,  the  imbalance  on  world 
agricultural  markets  could  be  removed.  In 
additiop,  the  world would so ·get rid of sorne of 
its  other  unsolved economie  problems,  which derive  from  the  structural differences  among 
the  five groups of countries.  A world-wide and 
universal  redistribution  of  national  incomes 
would,  for  instance,  make  room  for  a  new 
pattern of international specialization and, with 
it,  a  new  pattern of world tracte in agrieultural 
commodities and in manufactures alike. Fin  aU y, 
it  would  be  possible  to  do  much  more to even 
out differences  in  the  levels of development of 
the five groups of countries. 
However,  a  solutio:rt  of  so broad a scope is not 
feasible at present. 
Leaving  aside  a  world  political organization, 
one  might  think  of  a  world  economie  policy. 
This  would  be a less far-reaching solutiol)., but 
still  a  lasting  and effective  one.  It  could do 
less  to  even  out  differences  in  the  level of 
economie  development,  but  certainly would  be 
conducive  to  harmonization of the participating 
countries'  economie  interests  over  a  broad 
field,  and  in  particular  would  transcend  the 
narrow  limits  whieh  today  circumscribe  the 
sphere  of  action  and  possible  success of  any 
international  tracte  policy.  World-wide  co-
ordination of the  means  and  measures of eco-
nomie  policy  would  enable  the  existing  lm-
balances to be removed from world agrieultural 
markets.  If joint efforts succeeded in raising the 
consumption  and  net  imports  of  developing 
countries  (groups  1 and  2),  if  the  countries of 
group 3) directed to world markets their demand 
which  so far has  been  largely kept away from 
them,  and  if the  developed countries of groups 
4)  and  5)  adjusted their production to  the new 
world  market  situation, then equilibrium would 
come  about  at  much  higher  levels  of  world 
consumption  and  world  tracte  of  agricultural 
and  more especially food,  products.  But  this 
solution,  too,  would  presuppose a far-reaching 
relaxation  of  political  tensions  between  the 
major countries of  the  five  groups.  For this 
reason  it  is  not  practicable  today,  but  may 
become so for future generations. 
2. MARKET-ORIENTED SOLUTIONS 
The rehabilitation of world agricultural markets 
requires  a  solution, the political conditions and 
scope  of  which  are  such that  it can be applied 
at  once,  and  which  is market-oriented  in  the 
sense  that  it  specifically  aims  at  the  estab-
lishment  of  equilibrium  on  the  world 's agri-
cultural markets.  ln comparison with the two, 
today  still  impracticable,  solutions  of  an 
effective  political world  organization  and  of  a 
co-ordinated world  economie polie  y, an organ-
ization of world agricultural markets certainly 
is much  more  limited.  On  the other hand it is 
much wider in scope than the isolated measures 
which  have  so  far been  applied or discussed 
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with  a  view  of attacking one or the other of the 
symptoms  of  imbalance  on  the  world's  agri-
cultural markets. 
Market-oriented measures to organize the world 
agricultural market require international efforts 
on  a  world  scale  and,  given the  nature  of the 
existing imbalance,  they cannot remain limited 
to the trade aspects of the market alone (priees, 
interdependence of different commodity markets 
etc.),  but  must encompass  also  its production 
and  consumption  aspects.  Organization there-
fore  extends both  to  agricultural trade  and  to 
the  agricultural policies of partieipating coun-
tries.  To  be  effective,  it  will  require  new 
instruments specifically devised to deal with the 
peculiarities  of world  agricultural disequilib-
rium. 
Furthermore,  an  organization  of world  agri-
cultural  markets  can  be  effective  only  if  it 
encompasses  the  greatest possible  number of 
countries.  Even  if  the  new  market-oriented 
measures  may, in the first instance, apply only 
to  what  we  have called the developing (groups 1 
and 2)  and developed (groups 4 and 5) countries, 
they  should be  such that  the  centrally planned 
economies  (group  3),  too, may later join in the 
new arrangements. 
Fin  ally,  organization  must extend  to  all  tho  se 
agrieultural  commodities  which  are  substi-
tutable  either in  consumption  (e. g.  butter and 
vegetable  fats)  or  in  production  (e.g.  wheat, 
maize,  sugar,  etc.).  This  is the  only  way of 
preventing  disequilibrium  from  shifting from 
one  commodity  market  to  another.  The  im-
plication  is  not  that  the  form  and  content of 
organization must be the same for all commod-
ities ;  on  the  contrary,  it  should  take  full 
account  of  the  peculiarities  of  every  single 
product market. 
Such a new order of world agricultural markets 
must  rest  on  sorne  kind  of  foundation.  As 
indicated  above,  there  is  no  hope,  at present, 
of  anything  like  a  world economie  polie  y,  let 
alone  an effective  political world organization. 
But  the  countries  of . groups  2)  to  5)  do take 
part in world trade, and it does appear possible 
to  harmonize  their  structurally  conditioned 
.  interests.  This  is  a  foundation ;  its  solidity · 
will  depend  upon  the  degree to which interests 
can in effect be harmonized. 
Ill. IMPORTANCE  OF  ORGANIZATION 
FOR  DEVELOPMENT  POL/GY 
There  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  a. new 
order  of  world  agricultural market relations 
and  the implied removal of existing imbalances and  contradictions will benefit ·  world economie 
development  generally - if only because agri-
culture  occupies such an important place in the 
overall  economie  development  of  nations  and 
in their economie relations. 
Benefits  will  accrue  to  developed  and  devel-
oping  countries  alike,  as  the  discussion above 
has  made clear.  For the former, agriculture 
gives  rise  to  problems  the  economie  impli-
cations of which are felt more and more widely, 
and  which  are politically explosive  not  unlike 
minority  problems.  In  developing  countries 
agriculture  in  any  event  still  occupies  the 
dominant  position  in  the economy and accounts 
for  a  considerable share of their total exports. 
For the  rest, the great depression of the years 
1929-32  made  it  abundantly  clear  that  the 
relationships  among  agricultural markets have 
an  important  bearing  on  the  world economy, 
and  in  today's  altered  conditions  this  still 
remains  equally  true  with  respect  both  to 
cyclical fluctuations and to structural economie 
growth. 
In  this  sense  the reorganization of world agri-
cultural market  relations will help the  devel-
opment of countries, provided it takes sufficient 
account  of  their  interests.  But  an  explicit 
warning  is  in  order here : this reorganiza.tion 
is not a panacea for the solution of the problem 
of  developing  countries.  This  is an enormous 
problem  and,  as  the  experience of  developed 
countries  shows,  its solution requires the best 
efforts of severa! generations. 
1. ESTIMATES  OF THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES'  FUTURE 
CA PIT  AL  DEFICIT AND  FOREIGN  TRADE 
To  illustrate  the  extent  of  this  development 
problem, we  refer 1)  to the developing countries' 
share  in  world  trade  and  2)  to  their external 
indebtedness;  we  shall then attempt to estimate 
3)  their future capital requirements and deficit 
and  4)  the  possible  expansion of  their exports 
and imports. 
In  spite  of  the  care which  bas been  Iavished 
on the numerous calculations of the 1970figures 
in  the  following  tables,  these figures  can still 
be  regarded only  as hypothetical indications of 
possible  developments  up  to  1970,  which  are 
subject  to  many  unforeseeable  factors.  The 
same  applies  a  fortiori  to  the  1980  figures, 
which  really  do  no  more  than  cqnvey  sorne 
rather vague idea of what might happen. 
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1) The  developing  countries '  share  in  world  trade 
In  the  1950's world trade  expanded  by  95  per 
cent.  For  the  I960's  we  may  assume  an 
increase  of  79  per  cent  (details  of  the  cal-
culation  are  given  in  Table  1 of  the  Annex). 
Assuming the developing countries' exports and 
imports  to  take  the  course  outline  under 4) 
below,  the ir  share  in  world  trade  might  be 
as follows. 
EST/MATES  OF  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTR!ES' 
FUTURE SHARE IN WORLD  TRADE 
1960  1970  (1980) 
World trade (US  $ '000 
million)  125  224  (401) 
Exports  of  developing 
countries (in %)  25  21  (17) 
lmports  of  developing 
countries (in %)  26  24  (23) 
The fall in the shares of the developing countries 
is matched  by  corresponding increases  in  the 
sb  are  of  indu striai  countrie  s  as  well  as  in 
that  of  sorne  developed  agricultural  export 
countries and centrally planned communist one s. 
2) Growing extemal indebtedness 
The excess of the developing countries' imports 
over  their  exports  amounted  to  altogether 
~20  000  million  in  the  fifties.  To this must be 
added  sorne  ~13 000  million  of  payments  for 
servicing foreign investments and debts.  It will 
be  recalled,  however,  that  in  sorne  cases 
external indebtedness  used to be still higher in 
the  past,  and  was  reduced  by  the  war,  the 
dismantlement of  colonial  systems,  and rising 
world market priees for sorne commodities and 
at certain periods.  Now external debts threaten 
to  increase  again.  In  this  connection  it  is 
instructive to compare the developing countries' 
trade  deficit  plus  their interest and  dividend 
remittances, on  the  one band, with their intake 
of  capital (capital inflow)  on the other. 
The  developing countries' capital inflow  from 
abroad  is  seen  to  correspond  closely to  the 
sum  of  their  tracte  deficit  and  payments  in 
respect  of  interest  and  dividends.  In  these 
circumstances  their  gross  gold  and  foreign 
exchange  reserves  remained  more  or  Iess 
constant at just over US  ~  12 000 million. TRADE  BALANCE, INTEREST AND DIVIDEND REMITTANCES,  AND CAPITAL IN FLOW 
OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1) 
(US  1  '000 million) 
1950  1951  1952  1953  1954  1955  1956  1957  1958 
Trad.e balance  + 0.8  -0.1  -3.9  - 1.1  -0.7  -1.7  -2.6  -4.2  -4.4 
lnterest and dividends  -1.2  -1.4  -1.1  -1.1  -1.2  -1.3  -1.4  -1.4  -1.4 
Total  -0.4  -1.5  -5.0  -2.2  -1.9  -3.0  -4.0  -5.6  -5.8 
Capital inflow  + 0.4  + 1.0  + 4.3  + 1.0  + 1.9  + 3.0  + 4.9  + 5.5  + 5.9 
(1)  Excluding Eastem Europe, the USSR and mainland China, and the main petroleum exporters. 
Source: From GATT: lntemational Trade 1959, Geneva 1960. 
Official grants  accounted for roughly one third 
of  the  total  capital  inflow,  so  that  external 
indebtedness rose  strongly  in the period under 
consideration.  The  net  inflow  of private  in-
vestment capital was  less than the net outflow 
of  payments  earmarked  for  servicing  past 
investments and loans. 
3) Estimate  of  capital  requirements  and  capital 
deficit 
The calculations of capital requirements (input) 
rest  on  an  assumed  input ;output ratio  and  an 
assumed  increase  in  gross  national  product 
(output)  which  seem  feasible  in  developing 
countries.  For industrial countries this method 
is rather useful, because for particular reasons 
their  capital/output  ratio is largely constant. 
Developing countries  do not by any means have 
a  constant  capital/output  ratio,  and  in  their 
case  the  calculation is subject to reservations. 
Furthermore, developing  countries  sometimes 
have a fairly limited capacity to absorb capital. 
Among  the  various  inputs,  skilled labour often 
constitutes  the  bottleneck  most  difficult  to 
overcome.  This  explains  the  importance  of 
"human  investment " in these countries and the 
rather  long  periods  they need for  social and 
economie development. 
The following tabulation summarizes the results 
of calculations, the details and methods of which 
are  explained  in  Table  2  in  the  Annex. 
The following figures of the developing countries' 
future  capital  requirements  broadly  coïncide 
with  tho  se ( 
1
)  calculated by  W.  Hallstein,  P .N. 
Rosenstein-Rodan  and  B.  Fritzsch.  The  two 
figures  for  the  likely  capital  deficit  may be 
regarded as the upper and lower limits. 
(
1
)  Annual  capital  requirements  of  approximately  US  S 30 000 
million  during  the  1960s. Sources  are  given  in  Table  2  in  the 
Annex (footnote 5). 
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The  deve1opment  targets underlying the  above 
projections. are by  no  means over-optimistic. 
For instance,  national  incarne  per head  would 
still barely be  170  dollars  in developing coun-
tries by  1970;  in  western  industrialized coun-
tries it is toda  y more th  an US  ~  1500.  The gap 
between  per  caput  incarnes  would  scarce1y 
diminish  during  the  remaining  years  of  the 
sixties. 
EST/MATES  OF  THE  POSITION OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES  IN 1970 AND 1980 
{at 1960 priees; US  1  '000 million, except when otherwise 
indicated) 
1960  1970  (1980) 
Poflulation  (thousand 
mi  ion)  1.2  1.5  (1.8) 
National Income  145  245  (449) 
Gross National Product  165  278  (510) 
Per caput income (US$)  121  168  (252) 
Net capital requirements  20.8  49.2  (99.5) 
Net saving  11.6  28.6  (72.9) 
Capital deficit 
if  cagital/outputratio 
= 3.  9.2  20.6  (26.6) 
if  capital/output ratio 
(after 1970) = 2.5  9.2  12.4  (10.0) 
Sources are given in Table 2 in the Annex (footnote 5). 
It  is very hard to  say  anything  definite  about 
the capital/output ratio in developing countries. 
A  capital/output  ratio  of  more  than  3  would 
further lift the upper limit of the capital deficit, 
and so would lower saving.  But many countries' 
development  plans  allow  for  the  assumed , or 
even a higher, rate of saving. It  is  interesting to  compare  the  likely capital 
deficit  of  developing countries with  the  gross 
national  product  of  the  western  industrial 
countries,  which  has  an  important bearing on 
the latters' future development aid (see Table 3 
in the Annex). 
COMPARATIVE EST/MATES OF  CAPITAL 
DEFICIT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND 
GROSS NATIONAL  PRODUCT  IN  WESTERN 
INDUSTRIAL  COUNTRIES 
(OECD l\1ember States) 
1960  1970  (1980) 
GNP of industrial coun-
tries (US$ '000  million)  879  1276  (1.855) 
Capital deficit of  deve-
loging countries  (US  $ 
'0 0 million) 
if cattal/output ratio 
=  3.  9.2  20.6  (26.8) 
if capital/output ratio 
(10.0)  (after 1970)  =  2.5  9.2  12.4 
Capital deficit of deve-
loping countries (in  %)  1.1  1.6  (1.4) 
aer cent of GNP in in-
ustrial countries  1.1  1.0  (0.5) 
It  will  be  seen that,  although  our calculations 
suggest  that  the  capital  deficit of  developing 
countries  should  increase  fairly  sharply,  it 
will  still represent  much  the  same proportion 
of  the  industrial  countries'  gross  national 
product as it does toda  y. 
4) Estimates of future  exports and imports 
To  arrive  at realistic forecasts of the possible 
expansion of the  developing  countries' experts 
and  imports,  we  used  a  number of different 
methods  of  calculation,  as indicated in  Table 7 
in  the  Annex.  The  results of the  calculations 
are presented below. 
Experts  are  hardly likely to expand at a faster 
rate  than during  the fifties;  indeed, according 
to  F AO  projections,  the  rate  of  increase  is 
likely  to  flatten  out slightly. It will be recalled 
that  60  per cent of ali experts from developing 
countries  (excluding  Eastern  communist ones) 
to  the  rest of  the  world are agricultural com-
modities. 
Different  methods  of  calculation  for  import 
estimates  lead  to  comparable  results,  and 
this  applies  also  to the computation of imports 
as  the  sum  of  export  proceeds  plus  capital 
aid  (see  Table  6  in  the  Annex).  The figures 
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EST/MATES  OF  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES' 
FUTURE  EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(US  1  '000 million) 
1960  1970  (1980) 
Ex  ports 
1. On  extrapolation  of 
1950-1960 trend  31  46  (68) 
2. The  same  corrected 
by FAO projections  31  38  (51) 
lmports 
3.  On  extrapolation  of 
1950-1960 trend  33  55  (93) 
4.  On elasticity accord-
ing to Chenery  33  51  (85) 
5. E.jorts (l) + capital 
a1  37  58  (81) 
appear  realistic  and  may well prove  broadly 
correct - at  any  rate  in  the absence of major 
political or economie disturbances. 
2.THE  LONG-TERM  NATURE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  OF  DE-
VELOPING  COUNTRIES 
The  foreign  economie  relations  of  developing 
countries  reflect  their  fundamental  problems 
in  the  shape  of  growing  indebtedness  and  a 
growing  future  capital  deficit.  We  may  ask 
whether higher experts  might provide a means 
for  these  countries  to  extricate  themselves 
from  their critical position.  The  answer is : 
only  up  to  a  point.  Only  part of the import 
requirements  can  be  financed  by  increased 
experts.  This  is  shown  in  the  model  below, 
which  illustrates the  possible order of magni-
tudes  in  the  future  (details  in  Table  8  in the 
Annex). 
Possible  annual  increase  in  food experts from 
developing countries,  1960-70  =  ~2100 million 
lncrease  in  developing countries' food exports 
required to  finance their food imports, 1960-70 
= S7 200 million 
Possible  export  gap  (food)  =  ~5  100  .million 
Even  if the possible rate of increase .in experts 
were  to  double,  the problems of the developing 
countries  would  still remain unsolved.  ln the 
case  of  agricultural raw  materials  and  other 
products  the  gap between export possibilities 
and  import  requirements  is  even  larger;  it 
is estimated at US  ~12  000  million  in 1970.  If 
current  and  future  efforts  to  stabilize  priees 
are  crowned with  success, the  situation might 
ease somewhat. However desirable  such  a  strong expansion of 
experts  may appear, it is, for various reasons, 
hardly  likely to  happen  in  the  next  few years. 
Quite  apart  from  that,  there  would  be  sorne 
difficulty  in  the indus  trial co  un tries' absorbing 
such  a  hypothetical  increase  in  experts.  The 
European  Economie  Community,  for  example, 
a'Il  in  ali  imported food  for  ~  6 500  million  in 
1960,  of  which  ~  3 700  millions'  worth  came 
from  elsewhere  than  North  America:  and  the 
E FT  A  countries.  ln  ether  words,  even  a 
drastic change  in  external protection  and  im-
ports  in  the  EEC  - and,  for that matter, in 
ether  developed  countries  - would  not  solve 
the  problem of the developing countries, though 
it  would  improve  their  balance  of  payments. 
Given  the  magnitude  of  the  problems  of  the 
developing  countries,  and  given  the  enormous 
gap  which  divides  their leve!  of  development 
from  that  of  developed  countries  and  which 
makes  the  fo.rmers'  problems  so  big,  an or-
ganization of world agricultural markets can be 
but one  step toward the  long-term  solution of 
these problems. 
IV  THE  METHODS  OF  ORGANIZA TION 
1. STAGES  AND  SYSTEMS  OF  ECONOMIC  INTEGRATION 
The  graduai  removal.  of  obstacles  to  trade 
after  the  second  world  war after sorne  time 
encountered  growing resistance on  the  part of 
certain  countries,  · which  were  unwilling  to 
make  any  further concessions because of their 
Lalance-of-payments  and  competitive position. 
In such circumstances, closer links between the 
markets of  a limited number of countries offer 
an  opportunity  to  go  on  dismantling  trade 
barriers among themselves.  The most impor-
tant examples of such integration today are the 
EEC and E FT  A,  but in Latin America, too, nine 
countries  have  joined  together  in  the  Latin 
American  Free  Trade  Association  (LAFTA). 
Five  countries are trying to create an Organ-
ization  of  Central  American  States,  and  in 
Africa se  veral countries and groups of countries 
are working in a similar direction. 
We  may  ask whether economie integration is a 
suitable  way  to  arrive  at  a  harmonious new 
arrangement  of  market  relations.  We  shaH 
examine  this  question from  the  point  of  view 
of the  most diverse forms of integration.  The 
words  "economie integration ft  have two mean-
ings :  they can mean  a  process aiming at the 
removal of  various kinds of obstacles to trade, 
and  they can mean a situation in which various 
kinds  of  obstacles to  trade have  already been 
removed. 
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Often  political purposes  are  among the motive 
powers of integration.  This is certainly largely 
true  of  Europe  since  the  days  following  the 
first  world  war.  But it need not always be so. 
Economie  integration  in  the  Common  Market, 
for instance, which itself owed much to political 
motives,  has  now  created  - or  at !east not 
prevented  - an  economie  situation  for third 
countries  which  makes  integration a  pressing 
problem for sorne of them. 
Generally  speaking,  the  purpose  of economie 
integration  is to  improve  specialization within 
the  international division  of labour, and with it 
the exploitation of comparative cost advantages. 
This  gives more play to the economie principle 
according to which preference is to be accorded 
to  the  supplier producing at the  lowest costs. 
Often,  however,  the  treaties which prepare the 
way  for  an  economie  union  or  create  it lay 
down  no  more  than  the  broad outlines of  its 
means  and  purposes,  because  ample  latitude 
must be  allowed  at the outset for the many and 
varied  interests  involved  and for future devel-
opments.  The  text  of  the  Rome  Treaty, for 
example,  nowhere  mentions  the  concept  of 
integration.  The  paths  which  lead  to  the 
desired  integration,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
characterized by such concepts as ft adaptation ft, 
" rapprochement ",  ft alignment ",  ft co-ordina-
tion ft,  ft harmonization ft and ft uniformalization  ft. 
Comparison of  the  authentic  text of the Treaty 
in its four  languages  shows  that  no  consistent 
distinction is made between all these concepts. 
A  real  difference  of  meaning  is  made  only 
between  the  purposes  of  ft co-ordination "  and 
"common  policy ft.  The  former  indicates  a 
looser form of integration, preparatory  to fuller 
integration  in  the  form  of  a  common  polie  y. 
Economie history is rich  in  examples of inte-
gration  in  many forms.  Whate'Ver form it took 
however, and barring the compulsory unification 
of different economie regions, integration al  ways 
rested essentially on  the  removal of obstacles 
to  trade.  In  our times, on the contrary, more 
advanced  forms  of  integration  have  come  to 
the  foreground.  To  help  in  thé  discussion of 
this  problem,  we  show  below  a  systematic 
tabulation of the stages of integration and of the 
types of systems which, in practice, correspond 
to the ses stages.  But the process of integration 
need  not "al  ways  pass through the  se  stages  in 
the order in which they are shown. Stages of integration 
International  co-operation  among  individual 
markets 
Pree intra-trade 
Common economy  (internai freedom  of  move-
. ment  for  goods,  services, capital and  labour) 
Common policy 
International  co-operation among individual markets 
International co-operation here  takes the form 
mainly  of  commercial  agreements tending  to 
reduce  trade-restricting  practices.  The  re-
moval of  obstacles of  this kind constitutes the 
simplest form of integration. 
Free intra-trade 
Pree  intra-trade  in  the  shape of  a  free  trade 
area  or a  customs union  constitutes  a  higher 
stage  of  integration.  Within  the  free  trade 
are  as tariffs, quantitative restrictions and other 
obstacles  to  trade  are  suppressed,  but  each 
member retains  its own trade barriers against 
non-members.  In  a  customs  union,  members 
no  longer  pursue  a  tariff policy of  their own 
vis-à-vis third countries,  but  apply a common 
external tariff. 
Common  economy 
In  a  common  economy freedom  of  movement 
extends  not  only  to  goods  but  also to services 
and  factors  of  production.  At  this  stage  of 
integration, therefore, ali economie factors are 
exchangeable. 
Common  policy 
A  stili  higher  degree  of  integration  obtains 
when  the  members  of  a  common  economy 
harmonize  their  economie  policies.  Harmo-
nization is pursued only to the extent necessary 
for  the  emergence or functioning of a common 
economy. 
The  most  far-reaching  form  of  integration, 
fin ally,  is  unitary  polie  y  extending  even  to 
those  areas  of  national  decisions  which  need 
not  be  unified  from  the  sole  point  of  view of 
the  emergence  or  functioning  of  a  common 
economy.  At  this  stage  of  integration,  aU 
national  authorities  influence  the course of tfie 
economy in the same direction. 
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Corresponding systems of integration 
Trade-policy systems 
Pree trade areas, customs unions 
Common market 
Co-ordinated policies, unitary policy 
2. TRADE-POLICY SYSTEMS 
The  traditional  means  of  bilateral  and  mul-
tilater~l  trade  policy  rest on  the  principle  of 
reciprocity.  Countries  mutually  grant  each 
other  certain  trade  advantages  or  facilities 
with  respect  to  trading conditions, especially 
as regards tariffs and other import restrictions. 
ln  systems  of  this  kind  commercial  policy 
reduces obstacles to trade which, in their turn, 
reflect differences  in  the  competitive  position 
of countries, but  the  conditions of competition 
themselves  remain untouched.  So  long, there-
fore,  as  international competition  is regulated 
merely  by  trade  agreements,  it is stili often 
vitiated  by  subsidies of  variou~ kinds  and  by 
certain practices of fiscal  and  industrial leg-
islation,  anti-dumping  provisions, etc.  These 
practices  absolve  the  trading  partners  from 
having  to  even  out  the  structural differences 
in their production and consumption. 
The  trade-policy  method has the further defect 
that it can often not be applied at ali, or applied 
only  to  a  very  limited  extent,  in  the  trade 
relations  among  countries belonging to practi-
caliy  all  the five groups.  Developing countries 
have little chance at present to play an effective 
part  in  any  negotiations  or  concessions  of 
mutual  advantages,  since the  se countries' bar-
gaining  power  is re  stricted, or indeed reduced 
to  zero,  by  the  lop-sided  structure  of their 
demand  and  supply,  by  the ir balance-of-pay-
ments  disequilibrium  and  by  their  liquidity 
shortage.  Conversely, developed countries are 
compelied  to  raise  their supply of agricultural 
commodities,  regardless of  the  advantages or 
disadvantages this may have for their commer-
cial policy.  The classical rules of trade simply 
cannot come into play. 
Nowadays  the  trade-policy  method,  especially 
when  applied  to  agricultural trade,  often ends 
up  in  a  blind  alley for  the  mere  reason that 
trade  interests are  ali concentrated on access 
to  the  market of  importing countries,  without reference  to the latters' exports and conditions 
of  production  and  consumption.  This bias is 
all  the  more  crippling as  many  markets  are 
permanently saturated. 
It  follows  that the  trade-policy method  is  not 
sufficient  today  to  achieve  a  reorganization of 
world  agricultural trade relations.  We  have to 
look  to  higher  forms  of  integration  to  see 
whether  t'bey  offer  any  solutions  which  make 
wider  allowance for  the  domestic elements of 
each country's market situation. 
3. A  COMMON  MARKET  WITH  THIRD  COUNTRIES? 
Before  examining  the  chances  of  removing 
imbalances  from  agricultural  markets  by  a 
common  market embracing as many countries 
as possible,  it  will be  convenient to set out in 
a  digression  sorne  of  the  facts  and  factors 
which  characterize the impact which a common 
market  in  the  shape  of a customs union has on 
relations with third countries. This is a question 
of principle, anq as such justifies the digression. 
Digression:  Customs  union  and  third  countries 
In  quite  general terms,  a  customs union, as a 
higher form  of  integrat~on, involves  a number 
of  advantages  and  disadvantages  both for its 
members  and  for  third countries.  These  ad-
vantages  and  disadvantages  have  an  important 
bearing  on  the  question  whether this form  of 
integration  is suitable for  a  reorganization of 
market relations. 
The  benefits  accruing  to  the  members  of  a 
customs  union  stem principally from an inten-
sification  of  trade  with  better exploitation of 
comparative cost advantages.  The extent of the 
benefits is determined by the savings in factors 
of production. 
The  se benefits are associated with disadvantages 
if,  and so long as, the cheapest suppliers in the 
customs  union  have  only  the  relatively lowest 
costs,  that  is, if third countries can produce at 
still Iower costs and are therefore still cheaper 
suppliers.  The  creation of  the  union,  that is, 
of  a  regional  preference  system,  alters  the 
trade relations of members with third countries. 
Internai trade expansion (intra-trade within the 
union) is accompanied by trade diversion outside 
the union (external trade).  This trade diversion 
is  counteracted  by  an  expansion  of  external 
trade,  in  so far as cost reductions and growing 
incarnes due  to  more intra-trade (comparative 
cost  advantages)  are  reflected  in  additional 
imports  from  third  countries.  Unless  the 
expansion  of  external  trade offsets trade di-
version,  third countries  suffer disadvantages. 
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These disadvantages as a whole are determined 
by  the  extent of trade diversion which  is not 
offset, and by the cost and priee differentiais of 
supply  produced  at  relatively  or  absolutely 
Iowest  costs, by members and non-members of 
the  union,  respectively.  Disadvantages of this 
kind  naturally  persist  only  so  long  as  the 
costs of the relatively che  a pest suppliers, within 
the union, fail to ad  just to tho se  of  the absolutely 
cheapest suppliers outside the union. 
Non-members can also find sorne compensation 
in  an  intensification of  their tracte  with  other 
non-members.  This so-called secondary effect 
of  the creation of a union does, however, either 
not  take  place at ali or only to. a rather limited 
extent,  if the  non-members' trade lasses (dis-
advantages)  concern  one  and  the  same  group 
of  products  and  their  efforts  aU  concentrate 
on the export of precisely that group of products 
to the union. 
Non-members  have  yet  another possibility of 
compensation  in the  creation of new outlets on 
the  do me  stic market.  This  is  a  method  open 
to  third countries mostly when  they  happen to 
be  large, but apart from mere size a relatively 
Iow export dependence is of the essence. 
Fin  ally,  capital flows  from non-members  into 
the  union  lead,  among other things,  to  higher 
investment  in  the  union  on  the  part  of dis-
advantaged  non-members.  lt  goes  without 
saying that  such capital flows. into a union with 
a relatively high cost leve! implies a deteriora-
tion  of  international  division  of  labour  with 
· respect to the product concerned. 
A  common market offers no solution 
A  common market is a suitable way to improve 
balance among agricultural markets provided it 
includes  aU  those  countries  which  are called 
upon  to  play  a  part  in  the  equilibration.  It 
follows  that the  common  market would have to 
encompass  a  large  number of  countries from 
groups 2)  to 5). 
We  do  not wish to enter, here, into the political 
problems  involved  in  the  creation of  a  large 
common market;  but over and  above  these, it 
would entai! also economie difficulties from the 
point  of  view  of both  developed and developing 
countries.  These difficulties may be described 
as follows. 
Earlier  attempts  at  integration,  which  were 
largely  inspired by power politics, often meant 
the  combination of  areas  with  complementary 
patterns  of  production,  and  the  benefit  was 
sought in increased autarky  .. But true economie benefit in the sense of greater welfare can come 
only from a combination of competing economie 
unit s. 
The  reduction  of  obstacles· to  trade  among 
competing  economie  units  producing  largely 
similar  commodities  leads  to  a  shift  of  pro-
duction  from  comparatively  high-cost  to com-
paratively low-cost  capacities.  The benefit is 
an the  larger,  the greater the cost differentiai 
of  competing  branches  of  production  before 
integration. 
Conversely,  the se  advantages  will  not  occur 
when  complementary economies are integrated 
unless steps are taken to allow for the imbalance 
between  these  economies  and  the  differences 
between  them,  and  also for the development of 
tracte  relations  with  non-member countries, in 
the  same  way  as  allowance for  these  factors 
was  made  in  the  association  agreements  with 
Greece,  with  Turkey  and  with  the  associated 
African  States  and  Madagascar.  If  nothing  is 
done  about  these  factors,  it  can easily occur 
that  producers whose costs are high in relation 
to  those  of  non-member  countries  increase 
their  capacities  (and  their  production  costs) 
so  as  to  sell their goods  where  imports  had 
previously  been  drawn  from  other  Member 
States. 
Suppose th at mature economies with a full range 
of  production  and  comparatively high  costs  in 
sorne  economie  sector  x  are  integrated  with 
economies  possessing  only  a  few  developed 
sectors,  including.  a  Iow-cost  sector x;  inte-
gration  would  then  be  advantageous  for  the 
members  so far  as  sector x  is concerned,  in 
Une  with  our  considerations  regarding com-
peting economies.  But,  given  the  cost advan-
tages  of  the  developed countries' other supply, 
the  less  developed  countries  would  have  the 
greatest  difficulties  in  building  up  the  other 
sectors  of  their  economy.  They  would  find 
them selves in  sorne sort of depende  nee. 
Furthermore,  it  must  be  stressed that differ-
entiai  rates  of  growth  in  the  course of  time 
lead  to  considerable  differences  in  the  level 
of development - measured in terms of national 
incarne per head -or  widen existing differences. 
There  is  no  law  that  says  that  integration 
makes  for  similar  rates  of  growth.  On  the 
eve  of  the  EEC 's new  integration  stage  at the 
end  of  1962,  for  instance,  the  rate of  growth 
had  slowed  down  markedly  in  the  Federal 
Re public  of  German  y,  but  showed  no  sign of 
deceleration  in  France  and  Italy.  Even  less 
can  integration  be  expected  to lead to anything 
like  "compensatory  rates  of  growth ",  which 
would  tend  to  even  out  existing differences  in 
development levels. 
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On  the  contrary,  the  removal of  obstacles  to 
tracte  between  economie  regions  and  national 
economies at widely different levels of develop-
ment has often aggravated the disparity. Capital. 
raw mate  rials and labour migrate from th~ Iess 
developed to the more developed regions, mainly 
because  of  the  higher  productivity of  capital., 
external  economies,  and  the  higher  level  of 
employment  in  the  more  developed  regions. 
Even  in  mature  economies,  economie  growth 
is ·  associated  with  increasing  regional  dis-
parities  - witness  Great  Britain  (Northern 
Ireland), France (certain south-western areas)., 
the  Federal Republic  of  Germany (sorne areas 
in  the  south  and east) and others - so much so 
that  governments  have  often  had  to  take com-
pensatory measures.  Certainly integration of 
economies  at  different  levels of  development 
must  not  be  expected  to  lead  to  automatic 
adjustment  through  the  market  mechanism. 
Another  important  point  is  that  union  in  the 
shape  of  a  regional preference  system radi-
cally  alters  the  position of every member of 
the union vis-à-vis third countries.  The change 
concerns  not  only the new and more favourable 
alternatives  now · open  to  the  member country 
both  as  a  seller  and  a  buyer,  but  also its 
bargaining power vis-à-vis outsiders. 
Before  integration,  the  buying  country  B  had 
to  fashion  its  behaviour  towards  the  selling 
country  A  according  to  the  alternatives open 
to  the latter.  Demands of B for concessions on 
the  part  of  A,  or B'  s  refusai of  A 's claims, 
were always limited by the possibilityof A turn-
ing  to  other  countries  C,  D or E.  Once the 
countries  B,  C,  D  and  E  are  integrated,  the 
seller  A  has fewer  alternatives and  his bar-
gaining  position  weakens.  The  union  gains  a 
natural  preponderance,  which  grows  with 
growing  membership.  The  greater  is  the 
preponderance  which  a  union  acquires  in  the 
redistribution  of  market  and  bargaining posi-
tions,  the  more  uncertainties  and  disabilities 
will  hinder the  external economie activities of 
non-member  countries.  A  number of  studies 
suggest,  for  example,  that  in  Europe  uncer.:.. 
tainty  regarding  the  member  nations'  tracte 
po licy has done more harm than the ir restrictive 
measures.  Growing membership also raises the 
union 's intra-trade  and  thereby  introduces yet 
more  change  into  its  tracte  relations  with 
non-members.  These  tendencies  are further 
strengthened  when  rising  per  caput  incarnes 
within  the  union  alter the  elasticity of demand 
for the products of non-member countries. This 
applies  in  particular to  agricultural commod-
ities. In  the  light  of  ail these  difficulties we  are led 
to  the  conclusion that economie considerations 
as  such  - leaving  aside  political considera-
tions -do  not speak for combining in one corn  mon 
market  ail the  third countries,  developed  and 
less developed  alike,  which  take  part in world 
agricultural  trade.  This  conclusion  is  vaUd 
whether  or  not  existing  customs unions  also 
join.  If such a union were limited to competing 
and  developed  third  countries,  many  of  the 
problems of  integration  would  not arise at ali, 
but  on  the  other hand  the  imbalance  on  world 
agricultural  markets  would  not  be  removed; 
on  the  contrary,  it  might  be  aggravated.  If 
only  a  few  developed  and  developing  third 
countries  were  to  join  together,  the  equi-
librating effect would be nil. 
4. SECTORAL  INTEGRATION  IS  NO  SOLUTION  EITHER 
Throughout the  short history of Europe'  s eco-
nomie  integration,  that  is  to  say,  since  1927 
when a  " European economie and customs union " 
was first discussed, two alternatives have been 
kept  in  view.  One  of  them  is sectoral inte-
gration,  th  at  is to  say,  integration  limited to 
one  or  severa!  economie  sectors,  such  as 
agriculture, or industry, or separate branches 
of  industry.  The  other extends to  ali sectors 
of  the  economy.  In  the  first case  integration 
can  proceed  separately  by  different sectors, 
in  the  second  it  is  prepared  and  put  into 
effect for the who le economy. 
Sectoral  integration  bas  the  advantage  that  it 
makes  for  the  more  rapid  and  more  certain 
subsequent integration of the remaining sectors. 
It  also  bas political  advantages,  especially in 
so far  as national  governments prefer partial 
integration because its political implications can 
be  appreciated  more easily.  The Stikker Plan 
of  1951  deliberately  envisaged  integration  by 
sectors.  Would,  then,  integration of the agri-
cultural markets of the largest possible number 
of countries  in  groups  2),  4)  and  5)  provide a 
chance  of  removing  imbalance  from  world 
agricultural markets? 
The  creation of  a common agrieultural market 
through sectoral integration would le  ad to certain 
shifts  in  the  agricultural sec  tor, which in tu rn 
would  cause  considerable  changes  in the com-
bination  of  factors  of  production  and  natural 
resources.  The  first  benefieiaries would  be 
the  production  capacities  of  those  countries 
whieh produce at lowest cost within the common 
agricultural  market.  As  against  that,  the 
production  capacities of countries producing at 
artificially high  costs  would  be  diminished or 
eliminated.  This  process can  take  place only 
to  the  extent that cost  ratios do  not  radically 
change  in  the  separate  integrated  countries. 
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High-cost couritries could drastically ration  alize 
the  production  of  certain  commodities  and 
thereby durably reduce their costs. 
The  creation of  a common agricultural market 
would  offer  its  members a number of benefits. 
Countries  with  comparative  cost  advantages 
can  widen their outlets, those with comparative 
cost  disadvantages  are  induced  gradually  to 
withdraw factors of production from agriculture 
and  di  vert them  to  industry,  and the  ir demand 
for agricultural commodities should be matched 
by  a  growing  domestic  supply  of  industrial 
products. 
As  a  matter of  fact,  structural change  of this 
kind  is  now  taking  place  in  practically  all 
industrial  countries  (group  5)  and  in  many 
developed  agricultural export countries (group 
4).  The  share of  the  labour force  employed 
and  of  the  capital  invested  in  agriculture  is 
declining either in  absolute  terms, or at !east 
in  relation  to  industry.  This  process would 
be  accelerated  by  sectoral  integration  in  a 
common agricultural market. 
Such  integration persupposes  the  fulfilment  of 
a  good  many  conditions,  among  which  two 
deserve special stress. 
The first condition is that industry must already 
be  expanding  when  the  process of  integration 
starts.  It  is  a·  lesson of experience that such 
processes  of  structural  change  are  doomed 
to  failure  when  industrial production has  not 
yet  be.gun  to  expand, or even  if  its expansion 
cornes  to  a  temporary  hait.  The  second con-
dition  is  that  the  cyclical  situation  must  be 
propitious.  Structural change would be difficult 
or impossible in a period of economie stagnation., 
let alone recession, unemployment, disorganized 
capital markets, uncontrolled priee  fluctuations~ 
and  so  on.  In  the  absence  of  these two con-
ditions  sectoral  integration  - or,  for  that 
matter,  any  process  of  integration  - would 
become  extraordinarily  difficult  or even  im-
possible. 
But  even  if  the  countries  concerned  enjoy 
economie  expansion and cyclical stability, sec-
tora!  integration  still encounters the  same -
though  sometimes less pronounced- economie 
and  political difficulties  that  have  been  shown 
to  exist  in  connection  with  a  common  market 
with third countries. 
The  creation of  a common agrieultural market 
would,  among other things, come up against the 
difficulty  that  the  countries  concerned  are 
pursuing economie and monetary policies which 
differ  widely  in  respect  of  their  objectives, 
scope and instruments, and are so contradietory that  they  cannot  be  harmonized,  and bence not 
neutralized,  within  the  framework  of  sectoral 
integration. 
Another  difficulty  is that  high-cost countries, 
whose  domestic  production  is being  replaced 
by  agricultural imports,  would  find  it hard to 
balance  their  external  payments.  There can 
be  no  certainty  that  the  diversion of  factors 
of  production and natural resources from agri-
culture  to  industry  will be  reflected  at  once, 
and  to  the  desired extent,  in  an  expansion of 
industrial exports. 
Finany,  a  number of  countries feel  unable  to 
make  sure  that  the  disadvantages their agri-
culture  would  suffer from  sectoral integration 
are  immediately offset  and politicany neutral-
ized  by  corresponding  advaritages·  in  other 
sectors.  This  applies  especially to  countries 
in the economy of which agriculture still  occupies 
the dominant place. 
We  are  led  to  the  conclusion that very great 
difficulties  and  problems  indeed  are  involved 
not  only  in  the  creation of  a  common  market 
for  third countries,  but  also  in sectoral inte-
gration  in  the  form  of  a  common agricultural 
market.  Only  a  few  countries  of  groups  4) 
and  5)  might find  it  a  suitable solution; coun-
tries  of  group  3)  would  probably  not  be 
interested  in  integration  at  this  stage,  and 
those  of  groups  1)  and  2)  would  find  the diffi-
culties unsurmountable in practice. 
For the majority of countries in an five groups 
sectoral integration would be out of the question 
and,  for that reason, appears unsuitable for the 
organization  of  world  agricultural  markets. 
No  doubt,  many  of  the  difficulties which  are 
unsurmountable  at  present could be  overcome 
if  the  process  of  sectoral  integration  were 
spread  over  a  prolonged  adaptation  period. 
But  even  apart from  the question whether long 
transition  periods  are  at  an  compatible  in 
practice  with  the  creation of  a  common  agri-
cultural  market,  they  are certainly ruled out 
for  an  organization  of  world  agricultural 
markets,  which  must  be  cured of their imbal-
ance as quickly as possible. 
5. CO-ORDINATION  OF  NATIONAL  AGRICULTURAL  MAR-
KETS 
The world'  s  agricultural markets cannot, the  re-
fore,  be  organized  either  with  the  help  of 
commercial po licy, or  through a corn mon market 
for aU  products or for agricultural commodities 
alone.  We  are  left  with  the  possibility  of 
organizing world  agricultural markets through 
the  co-ordination  of  national  agricultural 
markets. 
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Co-ordination  to  this  end  signifies  more  than 
that  agricultural policy  in  each country should 
add  to  its  own  objectives  also  the  purpose  of 
establishing  equilibrium  between  supply  and 
demand  on  the  world  market.  The  crucial 
element is th  at each participating country under-
takes  the  obligation to  play  its  assigned part 
in  the  reorganization of  agricultural markets. 
In  its  practical  application,  co-ordination  of 
national agricultural markets would be a distinct 
step  forward  in  comparison  with  the  present 
state of  affairs, when every country carries on 
its  own  policy  and  organizes  its own  market 
without  reference, or indeed  in  opposition,  to 
aU others.  Whether the method of co-ordination 
will turn out  to  be  sufficient for  ali products, 
depends  upon the kind of agreements that coun-
tries are willing to make. 
V.  THE  TEN  PRINCIPLES  OF  ORGANIZAT/ON 
Before discussing the instruments of organiza-
tion,  we  first  have  to  define  the  principles 
which  must underlie  an  organization of world 
agricultural markets.  These principles fonow 
from  the  disequilibrium  described,  as well as 
from  the  motives  and purposes of organization 
with  a  view  to  the  removal of this disequilib-
rium. 
1.  The  first principle  is that  the food  deficit 
of  developing  countries  should be  made  good 
as far  as  possible (1),  by  means of  production 
and  marketing  improvements.  This applies to 
that  part  of  the  food  deficit  which  is  not 
covered because the countries concerned either 
do  not  have  the  financial  resources to pay for 
imported  food  or use  them for other imports 
(capital  goods  etc.).  It  applies further to that 
part of the food deficit which cannot be covered 
because  the  food  cannot be  taken to  the  con-
sumera who  need it (infrastructures) or  bec  a use 
the latter do not want it (food habits). 
2.  The  second  principle  is  that  developed 
countries  should  expand  their  consumption. 
Strong  exertions  to  raise  output  have  so far 
not  been  matched by  equany  strong exertions 
to raise consumption. 
3.  The  third principle  is that  the  part to  be 
played  by  individual  countries  in  satisfying 
world  demand  must be defined.  World demand 
is  the  sum of  effective  demand,  including  the 
demand  which  becomes effective by  virtue  of 
the  first  two  principles.  ln  this  connection, 
organization  will  be  faced  with  two  opposing 
tendencies.  Sorne  countries  will wish to make 
(1)  See  footnote  1)  p.  42. -~- ------- - - ------·------ -------·--'  ___ c_ 
sure that their present market shares, possibly 
slightly  amended upwards or downwards, serve 
as  the  yardstick for future allocations.  Others 
will  wish the decisive element to be not market 
shares,  but  each country's  qualifications.  ln 
this  latter respect,  there will also be different 
tendencies.  Sorne  countries  will press for the 
application of  the  principles of the competitive 
market  economy  (comparative  costs),  others 
will  give  the  primacy  to  considerations  of 
economie  development  Oevel  of  per  caput 
income, export dependence). 
4.  The  fourth  principle  is  that  supply  should 
be  adapted  to  the  level of  world  demand.  In 
cases  of  groups  of  products  where  output, 
including existing stocks, exceeds world demand, 
production should be restricted; in the opposite 
situation,  production  should  be  raised.  Both 
measures  may go  hand in band when production 
in  developed  co  un tries is to be diminished and 
production in developing ones increased. 
5.  The  fifth  principle  is that  limits  must be 
laid  down  for  stocks exceeding normal storage 
and  reserves.  Stocks  above  that limit  should 
be cleared. 
6.  The  sixth principle  is that  world  agricul-
tural  market  relations  should  be  reorganized 
in  such  a  manner  that  in  the  long  run the 
market mechanism can again become operative 
to  the  greatest  possible  extent.  In  the  long 
view,  therefore,  it  would  be  preferable  to 
regulate  priees  rather  than  quantities.  In 
principle,  the  exchange of goods should be on a 
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commercial  basis ;  non-commercial  transac-
tions  should  be  envisaged  only  for  special 
cases, and not as a permanent solution. 
7.  The  seventh principle is that the distortion 
of  world  market  priees  must  be  eliminated. 
The  most diverse  points of  view may be taken 
into  account  in  this  connection,  but  in  any 
event world market priees should not fall short 
of  the  genuine  production costs of  the  lowest 
bidders  (whose costs, or priees plus subsidies, 
are the lowest). 
8.  The eighth principle is that the organization 
of  world  agricultural  markets  should,  in  the 
first  place,  encompass  the  most  important 
foodstuffs  and  should later be  extended  to  all 
other foods.  Eventually important agricultural 
raw  materials  should  also  be  included  in  the 
organization  of  world  agricultural  markets. 
9.  The nin  th principle is th  at as many countries 
as possible should take part in the organization 
of world agricultural markets, so asto safeguard 
the  effectiveness of the agreements concerning 
world agricultural tracte.  This applies particu-
larly also  to  the  centrally planned economies, 
the  importance of  which for world agricultural 
market  equilibrium  is  likely  to  be  far from 
negligible in the future. 
10.  Due  allowance made for different economie 
systems and policies, the instruments of organ-
ization  must  be  equivalent.  Each  country 
would  be  free  to  choose  what  instruments  to 
apply. C.  THE INSTRUMENTS OF WORLD  AGRICULTURAL  MARKET  ORGANIZATION 
It  remains  now  to  describe  the  instruments 
which  commend  themselves for  a  reorganiza-
tion of world agricultural markets. More pieces 
may  be  needed  out  of  the  tool  box,  or fewer, 
according to  the requirements of each separate 
commodity market, but always three categories 
of  measures will  be  relevant : those belonging 
to  consumption  polie  y,  production  po licy  and 
foreign  tracte  policy.  Whatever  particular 
instruments out of the three groups are applied, 
should  be  attuned  to  each  other.  Sorne  are 
mutually  substitutable,  so  that  a choice can be 
made between them. A  fourth group of measures, 
transfer  of  demand,  can  be  applied  to  food 
products  with  market effects  similar to  those 
of  free  competition,  and  makes  many  instru-
ments  of  the  other three categories redundant. 
To reorganize the world's agricultural markets, 
countries  might  undertake  the  obligation  to 
achieve  certain  definite  results  by  means  of 
agricultural policy measures.  Given the present 
state of international co-operation the se obliga-
tions  should  refer only  to  the  results, leaving 
countries  free  to  choose  their  instruments. 
This principle underlies the following discussion 
of possible instruments. 
/.  CONSUMPTION  POL/GY 
1. EXPANSION  OF  CONSUMPTION  IN  LESS  DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES 
In  the  majority of the less developed countries 
of  groups  1)  and 2), and also in sorne countries 
of  group  3),  consumption  should  be  expanded 
in  the  first  instance  with  a  view  to  reducing 
their  food  deficit  to  the  extent  possible.  As 
regards  that  part  of  the  food  deficit  which 
remains uncovered for financial reasons, finan-
cial contributions by developed countries might 
enable  food-deficit  countries  to  expand  their 
demand for food on the world market. 
Large-scale action will, furthermore, be neces-
sary with respect to that part of the food deficit 
which must persist so long as the food cannot be 
moved  to  the consumers or as the latter do  not 
eat it.  Specifie measures include the improve-
ment of  infrastructures, especially as regards 
means  of  communications,  distribution  net-
works,  storage  facilities  and  processing and 
packing facilities.  Consumption habits will have 
to  be  improved through educational campaigns, 
school  feeding  and  mass feeding,  and  certain 
dietary taboos must be overcome. 
The  development  of  a  distribution  network  is 
very important, in so far as it releases markets 
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from  regional autarky  and isolation and facili-
tates  the  exchange  of  goods  and  merchandise 
of aU kinds, including producer goods.  Here is 
an  opening  for  using  consumption  policy for 
the  economie  development  of  the  developing 
countries.  In  most countries  suffering a food 
deficit  the  improvement of infrastructures is 
of the essence for any expansion of consumption, 
because food  deliveries  do  not  reach the  bulk 
of the  population.  What  they  lack above all is 
a network of distributors throughout the country. 
Calculations  for  the  majority  of  developing 
countries  show  that  only  9  per  cent  of  the 
population  live  in  ports,  and  less than  20  per 
cent in areas near the coast. 
Different countries have  very different possi-
bilities of raising the consumption of individual 
commodities.  Grains  are  important  in  this 
context,  in  so  far as  they  are comparatively 
easy and cheap to store, process and distribute, 
but  even  in  this  case  there  are  limits,  as 
Ame rie  an experiences with the non-commercial 
utilization of  grains bas  shown.  Legumes are 
a  cheap  and  convenient  source of protein  and 
it is often  said that their consumption could be 
greatly increased.  No clear results are yet at 
band re  garding a number of attempts to raise the 
consumption  of  milk  powder  in  food-deficit 
countries  through  new  methods,  such  as the 
reconstitution of dried milk in consumer areas, 
collective meals, etc. 
In  the last re  sort, the extent to which consumption 
is to  be raised in these countries depends upon 
the  available amount of financial resources and 
technical  assistance.  However, experience bas 
shawn more than once that the intensüication of 
aid  programmes is apt to lead to progressively 
rising qosts.  Such programmes must certainly 
not  go  beyond  the  point  where  they  begin  to 
disturb  the  domestic  market  and  domestic 
production  of  beneficiary  countries.  An 
expansion  of  consumption  requires  not  only 
financial re  sources, but also time-and contrary 
to  what  happens in developed countries, capital 
can  substitute  for  time  only  within  narrow 
limits. 
The  non-commercial  utilization  of  surpluses 
can,  for various  reasons,  not  be  regarded  as 
a  long-term  solution,  though  it  may  have  its 
usefulness  as  a  temporary measure for cir-
cumscribed pro  jects of consumption polie  y and 
for  emergency  relief  etc.  (see  below  under 
Export  policies).  Suitable projects include the 
creation of national food reserves in developing 
countries,  improvement  of  food  habits  (e.g. 
school  lunches),  the  elimination  of  certain 
taboos  and  the  opening  up  of  new  outlets. 2.  EXPANSION  OF  CONSUMPTION  IN  DEVELOPED  COUN-
TRIES 
Since  the  earliest days  of  industrialization  in 
Western Europe and North America most, and the 
most important, measures of agricultural po  licy 
have  concentrated on  the  regulation of supply. 
The  conditions  of  agricultural  production 
claimed the lion'  s  share of public attention, and 
little  was  done  to  influence  demand.  No  de-
liberate  measures were regarded as necessary 
with  respect  to  consumption,  which,  it  was 
generally assumed, would ad  apt itself to supply. 
This  attitude,  of course, is explicable in terms 
of  the  experiences  of  past  centuries,  when 
broad classes of the population of most countries 
suffered  chronic  food  shortages.  In  other 
sectors  of  the  economy,  too,  the  supply  side 
received  much  more  attention  from  both 
economie  the  ory and  economie  polie  y.  lt was 
not  until  after  the  world  agricultural  crisis 
that  the  first  major signs  of  a  new  approach 
became visible,  under which  growing attention 
was  paid to the processes of demand as well as 
to  more  far-reaching  measures  to  influence 
consumption.  But the second world war stopped 
this  new  approach  in  its  tracks  and  moved 
agricultural production back into the limelight. 
This  is why  we still have done little or nothing 
to develop instruments to influence consumption. 
There  are,  it  is  true,  quite  a  few  specifie 
measures  designed  to  raise  consumption,  but 
with  few  exceptions  they  concern substitutable 
products  like  margarine  and  butter, etc.,  and 
they  are  applied  by  the  most  diverse  insti-
tutions,  such  as  producer  associations,  co-
operatives,  sales  organizations,  etc., without 
any sort of effective co-ordination. 
Deliberate consumption  policy in the developed 
countries,  too,  is an  important  instrument for 
the  organization of world agricultural markets. 
In  these  countries,  it  will  be  a  matter  of 
raising  the  quality rather than  the  volume  of 
consumption.  So  long. as the  demand  schedule 
remains  unchanged,  there  is  little  room for 
quantitative  expansion,  and  it  will  be  more 
important to change the structure of consumption 
in  qualitative  terms,  to  the  benefit  of  more 
valuable  products.  A  considerable  part  of 
consumption  should  be  shifted  to  animal 
products, and even within this latter group the  re 
is room for large-scale  shifts to  better qual-
ities.  Over  and  above  that,  the  spread  of 
refrigeration has  made  it possible to consume 
all the  year round  many foodstuffs which used 
to be only in seasonal supply. 
Consumption policy can, thus, raise the demand 
for  quality  products,  which  should  lead  to  a 
considerable  expansion  of  the  consumption  of 
secondary  calories.  Comparative  figures  of 
per  caput  incomes  and  food  consumption  in 
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Western  Europe  and  the  United  States  show 
that  with  growing  incomes  Western  Europe 
.should  still  have  a  considerable  margin  for 
improving the  quality of  its food consumption. 
lt needs  a  co-ordinated  consumption policy to 
raise  the consumption of high-quality products 
and the food expenditures of private households. 
The  authorities  responsible  for  agricultural 
policy  will  have  to  collaborate  with  the  food 
industry  and  trade  to  discharge this important 
task.  Just  as  every  effort was  made  in the 
past  to  make  sure of  a  good  harvest year, so 
every  effort  will  now  have  to  be  made  to 
guarantee  a  good  consumption year.  The war 
bas taught us  what  astonishing results can be 
achieved  by  a  broad programme of consumer 
guidance  in  the  fields  of  individual choice and 
even ·the  voluntary  reduction  of  consumption; 
even  more  success  can  be  expected when  it 
cornes  to  raising the  quality of consumption in 
an affluent society. 
Il.  PRO DU CT ION  PO LICY 
1. ADJUSTMENT  OF SUPPLY TO WORLD  DEMAND 
ln  view of  the  food  deficit  and  the shortage of 
foreign  exchange  from  which  less  developed 
countries  in  groups  1)  and  2)  suffer,  many of 
them desire, or need to, expand the ir  production 
of  agricultural commodities.  But often enough 
theirs is a  high-cost  production,  which  is  apt 
to  create  additional  problems , for  the  rela-
tionships  among  the  world 's  agricultural 
markets,  even  though  in  the  case  of  most 
ccunmodities the  se countries have little influence 
on  the  world  market.  ln any event, the instru-
ments described below should have a dampening 
effect on  the  production of  many commoditie  s 
in  developing countries.  But  it  should always 
be  borne  in  mind  that  the  development  of 
agricultural production at low comparative c.osts 
in  these  countries  would  be  of  the  greatest 
importance  to  their  general economie  devel-
opment, for  a  number of  reasons  having to do 
with capital formation, employment, etc. 
ln  developed  countries  of  groups  4)  and  5) 
lasting prosperity demands  that the production 
of  certain agricultural products be  restricted. 
In  the  first  place,  sorne  individual countries 
might consider discontinuing certain production-
raising measures, such as tho se which encourage 
an extension of agricultural are  a. Priee supports 
could  be  dismantled  up  to  a  point,  but  the 
resulting slight fall  in priees would not neces-
sarily restrict the  output  of  the products con-
cerned ;  on  the contrary, experience has shown 
that  in  sorne  cases output  even expands  tem-
porarily.  Still, a priee fall would make producers 
more willing to adapt themselves to the changed 
situation  in  the  future,  and  to  re  act  more 
readily to further measures. But  governments  cannot  increase the pressure 
on  producer priees up  to the point where output 
contracts  to  the  desired extent,  unless  sorne 
arrangements are made to compensate farmers 
for  loss  of  income.  No  satisfactory results 
have  so  far  been  achieved  in  practice  with 
subsidies  not  tied  to  particular commodities; 
they al  ways end up by raising production. The re 
is  much  to  be  said  for  direct income  com-
pensation payments, which really can be applied 
in  a  neutra! way ;  they  should  be  so designed 
as to  induce  young  people and adults to change 
their  occupation,  and  older  smaU  farmers 
without  heirs to  liquidate  the  farm.  However, 
the  introduction  of  such  income  compensation 
in  combination  with  priee  reductions  cornes 
up against aU  sorts of resistances. 
The  experience  gained  in  the  last few decades 
in  connection  with  widely varying markets in  a 
large  number  of  countries  shows  that  as  a 
general  rule  regulation  of  priees should  have 
preference over regulation of  quantities, as in 
Principle 6 above. 
If  priees  cannot  be  reduced  sufficiently, 
countries  may in certain pressing situations be 
compelled to re  strict production by direct inter-
vention.  ln such cases it would be advisable to 
take  joint  action  to  restrict  the  output  of 
important  commodities  in  aU  countries.  Nor 
should  the  group of  " important commodities " 
be  defined  too  narrowly,  since producers· are 
apt  to  take  evasive  action  by  shifting to other 
commodities  produced  or consumed in similar 
conditions. 
There  are  a  number  of  ways  in  which  su~h 
restrictions  could  be  introduced  in  practice, 
but  the  merit of  various formulas  remains  to 
be  examined  in  detail.  The  output  of  all 
countries  might,  for  instance,  be  limited  in 
accordance  with  the  size  and  the  foreseeable 
trend of  world  demand.  The methods and data 
of food  balance  sheets may be valuable in this 
connection,  even  though  their accuracy  is by 
no  means undisputed at present.  The restricted 
total output  can then  be  allocated  to countries 
by  means  of  national  quotas  according  to  a 
number  of  different  criteria,  as explained  in 
P rinciple 3 above. 
National  quotas  should,  fin ally,  be  allocated 
among  individual farms  in  such  a manner that 
marginal producers  should  be  the  first  to  eut 
down  production  and  to  be  eliminated.  To 
this end  the  quotas  might be  made negotiable, 
so  that  low-cost  farms  could  buy  up  quotas 
and so contribute more to total output. 
In  distributing the national quota among farms, 
arrangements  should  also  be  made  for  the 
official  purchase  of  production  waivers.  A 
farmer should be able to seU to the agricultural 
authorities the  difference  between  the value of 
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his  past output  and of his  now  reduced  quota; 
be  would  sell the  waiver (value difference) for 
a  number of  years ahead  and  at a  priee fixed 
anew each year, and would, in return, undertake 
not  to  buy  up  other quotas.  In  the presence of 
negotiable  quotas  and  saleable  production 
waivers  it  would  be·  mu  ch  easier  and  would 
occasion  much  less  friction  to  introduce  a 
system  of  direct  income  compensation,  than 
it would be in combination with a priee reduction. 
2. STOCKS 
Growing  imbalance  on  agricultural  markets 
causes stocks to become dependent upon current 
market  conditions.  Stocks  then  simply 
correspond to  the  discrepancy between  supply 
and  demand.  This  is how  in  sorne  countries 
the  accumulation of  stocks over the Iast thirty 
years  has  reached  dimensions  altogether in-
compatible with the original purposes and tasks 
of  stockpiling policy.  As  the  supply of  many 
important  commodities  kept  expanding  in  the 
presence of  less  rapidly  rising,  stationary or 
even contracting demand,  there  were  only two 
alternatives :  either to  store  the  commodities 
or else  to export them commerciaUy by means 
of subsidies or non-commercially under surplus 
utilization  programmes.  The  destruction  of 
surpluses  is  not,  today,  of  any  significance 
worth mentioning. 
These  stocks  constitute  a  serious  threat  to 
world  agricultural  market  relations.  Should 
any country wish to clear its stocks, its imports 
would  shrink or its exports expand, and aU  the 
weU-known  weapons  would  be  employed.  A 
sudden  increase  of  supply  on  oversaturated · 
markets de presses the exports of other countries 
and  may  lead  them,  in  their turn,  to increase 
their  stocks.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
growing stocks add to the strain on the markets. 
Pressure of stocks becomes a coercive element 
in fashioning the behaviour of surplus countries. 
For  these  reasons  the  problem of  stockpiling 
assumes great importance in the reorganization 
of agricultural market relations. 
It  will  be  up  to  production  policy  to  make the 
stockpiling  problem  manageable.  Countries 
will  no  doubt  be  unwilling  to  agree  at  the 
outset on any absolute limitation oftheir stocks; 
but  while  stocks  are  allowed  to  increase for 
sorne time, it could at least, from case to case, 
be  agreed that they should be increased only at 
degressive  rates.  After this transition period, 
countries  should  agree  in principle to  stop any 
increase  in  normal  stocks.  These, as also the 
following  regulations,  must of  course  apply to 
aU government, government-controlled and pri-
va  te stocks. Stock  clearance down  to  a  reasonable national 
quota must proceed gradually so as to keep dan-
ge rous  oversupply away  from  the markets.  ln 
recent years certain commodities were sold at 
any  priee  just  to  reduce  stocks,  and  as  a 
result,  the priee of coarse grains cif North Sea 
ports,  for  instance,  feU  from  DM  310  330 to 
DM  240/260 between 1956  and 1960. 
Reduction  quotas  may  be  fixed  in  terms  of 
total stocks or  of dispos  able quantities (domestic 
output  and  imports)  of  products.  lt  seems 
advisable  to  retain  the  traditional  principle 
according to  which  each country pays  its own 
storage  costs.  lt  may be  objected, of course, 
thà.t  a  country with  low  comparative costs is 
today  often  forced  by  the  behaviour of  other 
countries to  keep stocks, and would not have to 
do  so  if  competition  were  allowed free  play. 
But it would be rather difficult to make arrange-
ments  for  other  countries  to  pay part of  the 
storage  costs.  Nor would  such  arrangements 
necessarily  imply  a  quantitative  limitation of 
stocks;  on  the  contrary,  one would then expect 
large  accumulations in cost-favoured countries 
and  precisely their supply would  be kept away 
from  the  market.  Similar consequences would 
follow even if only countries suffering a foreign 
exchange  shortage  were  given  contributions to 
their storage costs. 
Ill.  FOREIGN  TRADE  POLICY 
1. MINIMUM  EXPORT PRICES 
Often  the  distortion  of  world  market  priees 
has  different  characteristics  in  the  case  of 
agricultural  commodities  than  it  has  in  in-
dustrial  sectors.  ln  industry,  priees  are 
frequently  kept  artificially  high  by  monopo-
listic practices ; in the case of many agricultural 
commodities, the priee is often kept artificially 
so  low  by  means  of  export  subsidies that few 
exporting countries, or none,  can produce and 
sell at that priee without subsidies in the widest 
meaning of  the  term.  Too low a world market 
priee  damages  the  interests of countries de-
pending  on  exports,  but  may work  out  to  the 
benefit of  importing countries,  including many 
developing countries. 
P rice distortions on world agricultural markets 
should  be  removed  by  means of cost-oriented 
minimum  export priees.  The minimum export 
priee for  any  commodity  should  be  defined as 
that  priee  which  covers  the  best  bidder's 
production  and  marketing  costs.  The  best 
bidder  is  the  supplier  who  can  produce  the 
commodity  at  lowest costs  and  sell it on  the 
world  market  at  the  lowest  priee,  without 
direct  or  indirect  subsidies to  production or 
tracte.  Furthermore,  it  should  be  stipulated 
that  the  best  bidder  must  have  supplied  a 
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considerable  part  of  the  world  market  for 
sorne  given  time,  because  only  then  can  he 
be  regarded  as  representative.  If  no  single 
best bidder can be  found  to  combine  ali these 
conditions,  two,  three  or  more  best bidders 
should  be  grouped  together  and  a  weighted 
average  priee  be  defined  as  the  best priee. 
Production or marketing subsidies of any kind 
have  to  be  added  to  the  best bidder's costs 
in  determining the  minimum export priee, and 
his  costs  should  be  determined  by  standards 
worked  out  on  the  basis of  wide-ranging ex-
perience in individual countries. 
Nobody  should  then  be  allowed  to  sell  the 
product  concerned  on  the  world  market  at  a 
lower priee.  Supplies  at  lower priees  should 
be  regarded  as  dumping  and,  as  such,  out-
lawed.  For the  purposes of  these  new  priee 
arrangements the traditional definition of dump-
ing  will  not do, in so far as it merely concerna 
the  case  when  a  seller  supplies  the  world 
market  at  priees  other  than  his  country's 
domestic  priees.  Anybody  is  perfectly free 
to  sell  on  the  world  market  at  any  priee 
exceeding costs, or the  minimum priee.  This 
will  indeed  happen  when  the best bidder satis-
fies  only  a  relatively  small  portion  of  total 
demand. 
Should  the  introduction  of  a  minimum export 
priee  raise  world  market  priees,  importing 
countries,  including developing countries, may 
suffer a  priee disadvantage.  But  provision to 
compensate  such priee disadvantages should be 
made  only for exceptional cases,  and  then  on 
a temporary basis. 
2. EXPORT POLICY e> 
Each  country's  exports  will  to  sorne  extent 
already be  governed  by  production  polie  y,  but 
in  addition gross or net exports may be  sub jec.t 
to  certain  rules  resting on  the  principle  of  a 
limitation  of  supply  on  the world market.  The 
restricted  total quantity  could  be  allocated  to 
national  quotas  according  to  the  criteria in-
dicated  in  the  Third  Principle.  Such  rules 
would indeed be effective in reducing imbalance 
on  world  agricultural  markets,  but,  in  the 
absence  of  other  measures,  cannot  remove 
the causes of imbalance. 
Export quotas are a somewhat rigid instrument. 
If  this  is  to  be  discarded,  export  subsidies 
will  have  to  be  made  subject to  certain regu-
lations.  The  principle  of  these  regulations 
should  be  that  no  country's export  subsidies 
may exceed  the  margin  of  support  (see  below 
under 3). 
(1)  As  stated  earlier,  sorne  instruments  may  be  used  alterna-
tively, since they can substitute for each other. As  already  mentioned,  the  non-commercial 
utilization  of  surpluses  is  not,  on  the  whole, 
to be regarded as a suitable instrument.  World 
· agricultural  markets  must  be  so  organized as 
to  remove  the  causes,  not  the  symptoms,  of 
imbalance.  Surplus  utilization  is,  therefore, 
to be contemplated only as a temporary me  a sure 
involving  progressively decreasing quantities; 
it may be directed to two purposes:  1) expansion 
of  consumption  in  less  developed  countries 
(consumption  policy),  and  2)  once-for-aU 
clearance of surplus stocks (production policy). 
Due  account  should  be  taken  of  the  fact  that 
surplus  utilization  in  connection  with  con-
sumption  policy  occasions  considerable  costs. 
In  any  event,  food  surpluses  can  be  used 
effectively in food-deficit countries  only if food 
aid  is  part of  a  comprehensive general devel-
opment  aid programme.  In  so far as surpluses 
are  used  for  food  aid  at  aU,  they  should 
al  ways be combined with additional development 
aid  amounting  to  a  multiple  of the value of the 
surpluses  so utilized;  a  ratio  of  about  1:5  bas 
be  en recommended (  t). 
3. IMPORT POLICY 
In  the  field  of  import  po licy,  the  kind  of 
action  most  in  accord  with  the  traditions of 
international  co-operation  would  be  to  dis-
mantle  external protection.  A  reorganization 
of  world  agricultural  markets  might,  for  in-
stance,  provide for certain measures to reduce 
tariffs,  equalization  levies, quantitative import 
restrictions and other obstacles to tracte. 
But  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that external 
protection  is  only  one  element of  the  support 
agriculture  enjoys  in  most  countries.  Sub-
sidies of ali kinds are another essential element 
of  it.  The  various  means  that  governments 
employ  to  support  agriculture  vary  greatly 
from  one  country  to  another  and  the  effect of 
any  single  one  is  difficult  to  measure.  Ir 
would  seem easier to assess the overall effect 
of  the  whole  set  of  support  measures;  this 
shows  the  level  of  support  that  agriculture 
enjoys  and  would  allow  of  the  calculation  the 
margin of support. 
The  total  margin  of  support  is  defined,  in 
principle,  by  the  difference  between  world 
market  priee  and  the priee (plus ali subsidies) 
which  is paid to  the  producer on the domestic 
market. 
e) See  European  Economie  Community.  Direction  Générale  de 
l'Agriculture,  L'aide  alimentaire  de  la  CEE  aux  pays  en voie 
de  développement.  Problèmes  posés  et  possibilités  réelles, 
Report  by  A.  Kruse  on  the  work  of  a  Group  of  Experts  con-
sisting  of  M.  Cépède,  A.  Maugini  and  H.  Wilbrandt.  Brussels, 
July 1963. See also FAO, Development through Food. A Strategy 
of  Surplus  Utiliz ation.  Revised  edition.  Rome  .1962.  Freedom 
from  Hunger Campaign Basic Study No, 2. 
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Instead of reducing merely external protection, 
one  migh,  therefore,  think  also  of agreements 
to  lower  the  whole  margin  of  support.  The 
margin  of  support  could  be  reduced  at  the 
same,  or  at  differentiated,  percentage  rates 
for ali countries. 
P rovided  the  instruments  of consumption  and 
production  policy  are  effectively  applied  in 
combination  with  a  reduction  of  external pro-
tection  import obligations are not necessary(
2
). 
If nevertheless guaranteed import quotas should 
be  thought  desirable for certain commodities 
during  a  transition  period,  the  obligation  to 
import  need  not  necessarily  be  fulfilied  by 
actual  imports,  but  could  be  settled through 
compensation payments(2).  Imports obligations 
should  not,  therefore,  be  used  to  regulate  the 
actual  quantity of imports.  Compensation pay-
ments  should  accrue  to  export  countries  in 
proportion  to  their  part  in  covering  world 
demand. 
IV.  DEMAND  TRANSFER 
1. THE  TRANSFER  OF  WITHHELD  IMPORT  DEMAND 
Since  the  last war  and  more especialiy  since 
the  end  of  the  Korea crisis low-cost producer 
countries  in  the  developed  groups  4)  and  5) 
have  been  exercising  growing  pressure  on 
importing countries of  the  same groups.  But 
developed  importing  countries  cannat  admit 
imports from  the  lowest  bidders to  the extent 
that  the  principle  of  free  competition  would 
imply,  for  they  have  built  up  or  expanded 
considerable  - and  high-cost  - production 
capacities  of their own.  The  maintenance or 
further extension of these production capacities 
is prejudicial to  the  best bidders, in so far as 
it  restricts  their  exports.  Nor  do  the  best 
bidders  find  satisfactory  ourlets  in  the  less 
developed countries of groups 1) and 2), because 
the  latters'  food  deficit  cannat be  translated 
into effective demand on the market. 
Given  th  at  the  developing  countries'  potential 
demand for food  is  likely to ri  se in the future, 
it might be agreed for purposes of reorganizing 
world agricultural markets, that developed coun-
tries  should  transfer the demand they withhold 
from the best bidders to developing food-deficit 
countries.  Industrial countries could transfer 
the ir import demand through compensation pay-
ments,  which  would  enable  the  food  deficit of 
less  developed  countries  to  be  transformed 
into effective demand. Each individu  al developed 
country would have to transfer as much demand 
e) For  import  obligations  and  compensation  payments  see 
Section IV below. as  it  "withholds"  from  the  best  bidders  by 
virtue  of  its  support  to  its  own  domestic 
agriculture.  Exporting countries are  to  take 
part in the satisfaction of demand in accordance 
with a priority sc  ale resting on the ir  comparative 
cost advantages(  1). 
Demand  transfer  ïs  a  frontal  attack  on  the 
paradoxical  contradiction  between  sup.pJy 
restriction  and  world  food  deficit.  If  high-
cost producer countries  were  obliged  to make 
compensation  payments  for  demand transfer, 
this  would  create  certain  economie  and  also 
political  pressures  domestically  against  what 
might  be  called  the  agricultural  policy  of 
isolation  and for  a dynamic agricultural policy 
to adapt agriculture to the new situation. 
The  compensation payments of industrial coun-
tries would enable developing food-deficit coun-
trie  s  to  bu y  at  the  be  st priee from the lowest 
bidders.  The  purchases  would  be  financed  in 
part by the developing countries themselves, and 
in  part  by  the funds furnished by compensation 
payments. 
The  system  of  demand  transfer  differs fun-
damentally from non-commercial surplus utili-
zation,  in  so  far  as the  former is applied in 
strict  conformity  with  the  principle  of  free 
competition.  The  greatest sacrifice falls  not 
upon  the  country with  the  largest  surplus, but 
upon  the  country which  "withholds "  most im-
port  demand.  The  largest share  in the satis-
faction  of  demand  accrues not  to  the  country 
which makes most financial re  sources available 
for the utilization of the commodities, but to the 
country  which  produces  at  the  lowest  com-
parative  costs  and  offers  the  cheapest supply. 
The  tracte  flows  called forth  are  not of a non-
commercial, but of a commercial nature. 
2. THE  EXTENT  AND  DISTRIBUTION  OF  FINANCIAL 
BURD ENS 
The extent to which demand is to be transferred 
will  have  to  be  determined  after  the  most 
careful  examination  of  the  situation.  The 
decisive factor is the  import capacity of food-
deficit countries, and this in turn is--determined 
by  the  demand  these  countries  would exercise 
on  the  world  market if they had enough foreign 
exchange.  To  this  must  be  added  that part of 
the  food  deficit  which  is  susceptible  of being 
translated  into  effective  demand  by  means  of 
consumption  policy,  as described  above.  The 
larger  is the  part of the  food  deficit  so to be 
transformed  into  effective  demand,  the  more 
funds  will be needed to finance the instruments 
of consumption policy. 
(1) This  obligation  undertaken  by  importing  countries  must 
find  its counterpart in exporting countries within the  framework 
of  the  principles set out under  C  - II above  in connection with 
production policy. 
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If,  in  this  manner,  a  fairly  high  target is set 
for  de  rn and  transfer,  sharply increasing world 
demand would generally lift world market priees 
beyond  the  level of any minimum export priees 
that  might  be  laid  down.  The best bidder with 
the  lowest comparative costs will be succeeded 
on  the  market by  the next-best bidder with the 
next-lowest  comparative costs,  and  so  on  and 
so forth. 
The  total financial  burden of demand transfer 
has  to  be  distributed  among  the  developed 
countries of  groups  4)  and  5)  (and  possibly of 
group  3).  Each country's  compensation pay-
m~nts  would  be  determined  by  a  "factor " 
made  up  of three  components  and  serving as 
an  indicator  of  the  import  withheld  by  high-
cost developed countries. 
First, this factor  must  reflect relative excess 
costs  in  each country,  which  in  tu rn  are ex-
pressed  in  the  margin of  support,  that  is, the 
difference  between  the  world market priee and 
the  - higher  - domestic  producer priee  plus 
subsidies. 
Secondly,  the  factor  must reflect the degree to 
which  the  demand  of  high-cost  countries  is 
covered  by  their domestic  supply.  High-cost 
countries  which  cover  only  a  small  part  of 
their own  demand damage  the  interests  of the 
least-cost  producers  less  than  do  those  with 
a  high  degree  of  self-sufficiency.  The former 
withhold less demand than the latter. 
Thirdly,  the  factor  must  reflect the  potential 
import demand,  that is, the size of the market, 
of  the  developed  country  concerned.  The 
amount  of  demand  withheld  from  the  best 
bidders  is  not  fully  determined  by  relative 
excess costs and the degree of self-sufficiency. 
The  size  of  the  market can  best be calculated 
on  the  basis of  the  number of inhabitants, and 
duly weighted per caput incarnes. 
There  are,  of  course,  also  considerable high-
cost production  capacities in many food-d~ficit 
countries,  but  these  should  not  be  asked for 
compensation  payments,  in  view  of  their  low 
per  caput  incarnes  and  the  small contribution 
the ir domestic production makes to an acceptable 
nutritional standard. 
3.  THE  APPLICATION  OF  THE  ECONOMIC  PRINCIPLE 
Demand  transfer is an instrument which works 
in  accordance  with  the  principle of free com-
petition or, for  short,  the  economie principle. 
This  principle  demands  that existing demand 
should  al  ways  be  met by  the  che  a pest  supply, 
that  is,  by  the seller producing  at  the  lowest 
comparative costs.  It  is  in contradiction with 
the  economie  principle  that  demand  should  be met by  high-cost  producers,  and that Iow-cost 
producers 'should  find  no,  or only insufficient, 
· outlets. 
But  this  is  precisely  what  happens  on  world 
agricultural markets.  Demand transfer, there-
fore,  would  create  such  market conditions  as 
would  obtain  under  free  competition,  and  the 
resulting new order in world agricultural market 
relations would comply with the economic~prin­
ciple. 
However,  the  distribution of the financial costs 
of  demand  transfer  may,  of  course,  follow 
criteria  other  than  the  amount  of  withheld 
imports.  These  costs  may  be  allocated, for 
examples,  according  to  certain  import  obli-
gations,  which  the  countries concerned could 
transfer  by  corresponding compensation pay-
ments.  Yet  other yardsticks might be applied, 
for  instance  the  export  ratio,  which  is  the 
ratio  of  the  value  of  exports to  net  domestic 
product  at  factor  cost,  or  else  the  ratio  of 
industrial  exports  to  agricultural imports to-
gether  with  the  degree  to  which  the  costs of 
domestic  agricultural  production  exceed  the 
lowest comparative costs. 
The instrument of demand transfer could, fin ally, 
be applied also in combination with international 
agreements  for  the  regulation of  world  agri-
cultural trade.  Importing countries defaulting 
on  their obligations  could  then  make  compen-
sation  payments.  Whereas basically the  de-
termining  factors  are  the  value  of  withheld 
imports,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  cost of an 
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expansion  of  consumption  in  less  developed 
food-deficit  countries, on the other, the amount 
of  compensation  payments  can,  in  this case, 
be  fixed  as  a  multiple  of  the  value  of the 
import obligations which the country concerned 
is unwilling or unable to honour. 
If  the  principles  according to  which  the  costs 
of  demand  transfer are  allocated to  different 
countries  are  altered,  or if  demand  transfer 
is  used  as  a  complementary  instrument  or 
indeed as a penalty, then the economie principle 
cornes  into  play only  to  a  much lesser extent. 
But. one  should guard  against over-simplifying 
generalizations.  The  question  of  the  extent 
to  which  the  economie  principle finds  appli-
cation  cannot  be  answered  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  instrument  alone.  There  are 
plenty  of  instruments  which  are  in  line  with 
the  market  economy  and  yet  in  the  long  run 
invalidate  the  economie  principle,  and  there 
are  others  which  are  not  in  line  with  the 
market  and  yet  in  the  long  run set the com-
petitive  mechanism  free  and  rehabilitate  the 
economie principle. 
In  comparison with the flexibility of the market 
mechanism,  sorne of the instruments discussed 
above  may  appear  rigid  or to  contradict the 
principle  of  the  market  economy;  but  their 
suitability  should  be  assessed  in  the  light  of 
their  long-term  effects  in  liberating  world 
agricultural markets from the imbalance which, 
so  long  as  it persists, disables the  economie 
principle. ------~----~----------------~~-------=------
- -~- --- -- ----------------
CONCLUSION 
The  organization of world agricultural markets 
implies  a  wide  range  of  rights and obligations 
for countries.  These rights and obligations are 
not  determined  solely  on  the  basis  of  the 
existing  advantages  or  disadvantages  of  the 
various countries'  agricultural production  and 
of  their position  on  the  world  market;  one  of 
the  decisive elements  in  determining the  part 
to be played in the future by individual countries 
in  the  new  agricultural  market  order is the 
efficiency  of  their  agricultural  policy.  In 
turn,  the  efficiency  of  agricultural  policy is 
reflected  in  its  ability  to  fit  into  the  pattern 
of production and consumption po licy and demand 
transfer,  as described  above,  and  also  in  the 
adjustment of  agriculture  to  the  changed situ-
ation.  The  individu  al countries' national agri-
cultural policies will thus necessarilycome into 
close mutual relationship. 
Once this happens, an international agricultural 
policy  begins  to  take  shape.  The first  step 
towards  it  is the  organization of world agri-
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cultural  markets,  in  a  situation  where  the 
consequences  of  national  agricultural policies 
have  long transcended national boundaries and 
where  these  policies  have  undermined them-
selves  by  the  imbalances  and  contradictions 
they created.  The  principles of the reorgani-
zation  of  world  agricultural markets  and  the 
outlines  of  an  international agricultural policy 
will  together form  the  foundation  of the  rules 
by  which  countries  might  agree  to  abide  in 
the  ir behaviour on domestic and world markets. 
Tbese  rules will go  to make up a  "code of good 
conduct "  which differs fundamentally from any 
of the  specifie codes that have  been proposed 
from  time to time for world agricultural trade. 
Unlike  these, the "code of good conduct" would 
co  nee  rn not  only the variOU$ countries' market 
behaviour, but also the ir  underlying agricultural 
policies.  If these two factors are regulated not 
separately, but  jointly,  then the conditions will 
be created for agriculture to find its way out of 
its national and international isolation. ANNE X 
The  Tables  which  follow  show  the  results  of 
different,  and  often  parallel,  calculations  and 
c·ross-checks.  As  already emphasized  in  the 
text,  no  amount  of  care in the calculations can 
make  the  figures  for  1970  anything  more  than 
hypothetical  indications  of  possible  develop-
ments  until  the  end  of  the  sixties.  The future 
depends  upon  too  many factors to be predicted 
with  accuracy.  The  same applies a fortiori to 
the  figures for 1980, which can do no more than 
convey  sorne  rather vague notion of what might 
be expected to happen. 
TABLE 1 
EST/MATES OF  THE  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' FUTURE EXPORTS 
AND IMPORTS AS  PERCENTAGES OF FUTURE WORLD  TRADE 
(US$  '000 million) 
1950  1960  1970  (1980) 
l. World  trade  62  125 (1)  224 (2)  (401) 
2.  Exports of developing countries  21.8  30.9 (3)  45.9 (4)  (67.9) 
3. 2 per cent of 1  35.2  24.7  20.5  (16.9) 
4. lmports of developing countries  18.8  33.0 (4)  55.4 (4)  (93.4) 
5.  4 per cent of 1  30.3  26.4  24.3  (23.3) 
(1)  Calculations from  GATT: International Trade 1960, Geneva 1961 and GATT: International Trade 1959,  Geneva  1960  give  61.8  for 
1950, and 125.5 for 1960 -the increase, therefore, is 95%. lncrease according to UN statistics: 56/112 000 million  =  98.9 %.  Increase 
according to Booz, Allen &  Hamilton lnc.: Management Consultants -The Emerging World Enterprise, 1962:  64/112000 million= 75%. 
(2)  The assumed increase is less than for 1950-1960 (Korea boom), say 6% per year = 79% (the same for 1970-1980). lncrease  according 
to Booz, Allen &  Hamilton lnc.: Management Consultants -The Emerging World Enterprise, 1962: 85%. 
(3)  Calculated from  GATT: International Trade 1960, Geneva 1961 and GATT: International Trade 1959, Geneva 1960. 
(4)  See Table 4: extrapolation of 1950-1960 trend. 
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EST/MATE OF  THE  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' POSITION  IN  1970 AND 1980 
(1960 priees; US  1  '000 million, except where otherwise indicated; 
1960  1970  (1980) 
Population (thousand million)  1.17 (1 )  1.46  (1.78) 
National income  145 (2)  245 (3 )  (449) (3) 
Gross national product  165 (2)  278  (510) 
National income per head (US  $)  121  168 (4 )  (252) 
Net capital requirements (5) 
if capital/ output ratio  = 2.5  17.3  41.0  (82.9) 
if capital/ output ratio  = 3.0  20.8  49.2  (99.5) 
if capital/ output ratio  = 3.5  24.3  57.4  (116.0) 
if capital/ output ratio  = 4.0  27.7  65.6  (132.6) 
Saving (6) 
Marginal rate of saving (in  %)  15  (19) 
Average rate of saving (in %)  7  10.3  (14.3) 
In absolute figures  ll.6  28.6  (27.9) 
Capital deficit (7) 
if Cl:}pital/ output ratio  = 3.0  9.2 (8)  20.6  (26.6) 
if capital/ output ratio (after 1970) = 2.5  9.2  12.4  (10.0) 
(1)  Calculated from  GATT: International Trade 1959, Geneva 1960 and UN/ECE: Economie Survey  of  Europe  in  1960,  Geneva  1961: 
1958"' 1.145, plus 2% per year: 1960 = 1.17; annual increase 1950-1958 according to GATT (op. cit.) = 2%, according to FAO: Agricul-
tural Commodities -Projections for 1970, Rome 1962 = 2.4 %. 
(2)  According to UN/ ECE (op. cit.) 1958 = 132 000 million; at 3.8% per year: 1960 = 142 600 million.  According  to  M.  Usui  and  E. E. 
Hagen: World Income 1957, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, GNP =  162 000 million; national income approx. 88% of GNP =  142 600 million. 
(l) Annual increase 1960-1970 = 5.2 %, 1970-1980 = 6.2 %.  According to GATT (op. cit.) 1960-1969 = 5.2%; according to UN /ECE (op.cit.) 
1959-1960 =  5.3 %; according to  F AO (op. cit.) 1958-1970 = 4.1 % mini.num and 5.2 % maximum. 
(4)  Annual rate of increase .. 3.3 %. 
(5)  Net capital requirements calculated from1960-1970-1980 increase inGNPtimes net capital/output ratio(net investment increase divi-
ded by in  crea se in GNP). The  se results broadly coin  ci  de with the calcula  ti  ons of W.Hallstein: Euro  pais  che Afrika-Politik (Lecture at the 
University of Tübingen, 5 May 1961), Europa Arehiv, 20 June 1961, P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan: lnternationalAid forUnderdeveloped Coun• 
tries, Review of Economies and Statistics, May 1961 and B. Fritzsch: Zum Problem  des  Umfangs  und  der  Verteilung  entwieklungsbe-
dingten Kapitaltransfers., Jahrbuch für die Sozialwissenschaft, Vol. 12/1961, who estima  te annual capital  requirements  of  developing 
countries in the sixties at around US  $30 000 million. 
(6)  Net saving, calculated from  GNP. 
(1)  Without dividends, interest and repayments. 
(8)  OECD: The Flow of Financial Resources to Countries in Course of E conomic Development in 1960,February 1962. Capital flow from 
OECD countries and Japan to developing countries 1960 =US $7 989 000 million. 
48 TABLE  3 
EST/MATES OF  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES' CAPITAL DEFICIT AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF  THE  GROSS NATIONAL  PRODUCT OF INDUSTRIAL  COUNTRIES (OECD  MEMBERS) 
1960  1970  (1980) 
1: GNP of industrial countries (US  $  '000 million) (1)  879  1276  (1855) 
2. Capital deficit of developing countries (US  $ '000 million) (2)  9.2  20.6  (26.8) 
9.2  12.4  (10.0) 
3. Capital deficit per cent of GNP  1.1  1.6  (1.4) 
1.1  1.0  (0.5) 
(1)  Calculated from UN  statistics for 1960, after conversion of national curre.ncies. See also P. N. Rosenstein -Rodan:  International  Aid 
for Underdeveloped Countries, Review of Economies and Statistics, May 1961. 
(2)  Table 2. 
TABLE 4 
EST/MATES OF  THE  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' FUTURE  EXPORTS AND IMPORTS: 
EXTRAPOLATION OF  PRESENT TREND 
1960 
Total exports 
Annual rate of increase 4.0% (1)  30.9 (2) 
E xports to  indus trial countri es 
Annual rate of increase 3.5% (3)  21.9 (2) 
Total imports 
Annual rate of increase 5.3% (4)  33.0 (2) 
lmports from  indus trial countries 
Annual rate of increase 5.9% (5)  24.0 (2) 
(1)  GATT: International Trade 1959, Geneva 1960.1949-1959 = 4.0%.1953-1959 = approx. 4%. 
GATT: International Trade 1960, Geneva 1961. 1953-1960 =  3.5 %. 
(2)  GATT  International Trade 1960, Geneva 1961. 
(
3
)  GATT  International Trade 1959, Geneva 1960. 1949-1959 =  4.3 %.  1953,;.1959  =  3.2 %. 
GATT  International Trade 1960, Geneva 1961. 1953-1960 =  3.0 %. 
(4 )  GATT  International Trade 1959, Geneva 1960. 1949-1959 =  4;9 %. 
GATT  International Trade 1960, Geneva 1961. 1953-1960 =  5.5 %. 
(5)  GATT  International Trade 1959, Geneva 1960. 1949-1959 =  5.8 %. 
GATT  International Trade 1960, Geneva 1961. 1953-1960 = 6.0 %. 
49 
(US 1  '000 million) 
1970  (1980) 
45.9  (67.9) 
30.9  (43.6) 
55.4  (93.4) 
42.3  (74.6) TABLE  5 
EST/MATES OF FUTUREIMPORTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTR/ES 
ACCORDING  TO IMPORT ELASTICITIES 
{US  1  '000  million, except where otherwise indicated) 
1950  1960 
1. National income (1}  100.9  145 
2. lmports (2)  18.8  33.0 
3. Ten•year increase in national income (in %)  ..  43.7 
4. Annual increase in national incarne (in %)  ..  3.6 
5. Annual increase in imports (in %)  ..  5.8 
6. lmport elasticity 1950·1960 •  5: 4  ..  1.611 
7. Annual rate of increase in imforts according to  import 
elasticity as 1950·1960 (in %  ..  5.8 
8. lmports according to import elasticity as 1950-1960  18.8  31.9 
9. Annual increase in imports according to Chenery's import 
elasticity (in %)  (3)  ..  .  . 
10. lmports according to Chenery's import elasticity  (18.8)  (33.0) 
(1)  Calculated from  GATT: International Trade 1959, Geneva 1960 for 1950 and 1960; see also Table 1. 
(2)  Table 1. 
1970  (1980) 
245  (449) 
..  ( .. ) 
65.1  (83.1) 
5.2  (6.2) 
..  ( ..  ) 
.  .  ( ..  ) 
8.4  (10.0) 
73.9  (191.6) 
4.4  (5.3) 
50.8  (84.8) 
(3)  According to H. B. Chenery: Pattems of Indus  trial Growth, American Economie Review, September 1960 and UN/ECE: Economie Sur-
vey of Europe in 1960, Geneva 1961 a  1% increase in national income implies a  0.85% increase in importa. 
TABLE  6 
EST/MATES OF FUTURE  IMPORTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
ACCORD/NG  TO  ESTIMATED EXPORTS AND CAPITAL  AID 
1. Exports (1) 
2. Capital aid (2) 
3. Capital aid in the form  of imports (3) 
4. lmports according to 1 + 3 
(1)  Table 1. 
(2)  Table 2 -Average of the maximum and minimum capital deficit. 
(3)  Assumed to amount to 70% of total capital aid. 
1950 
21.8 
50 
1960  1970 
30.9  45.9 
9.2  16.5 
(6.4)  11.6 
(37 .3)  57.5 
{US  1  '000 million) 
(1980) 
(67 .9) 
(18.3) 
(12.8) 
(80.7) TABLE  7 
SUMMARY  OF  CALCULATIONS IN  TABLES 2,  4,  5 AND 6: 
EST/MATES OF  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES' FUTURE  EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(US S  '000 million) 
1950  1960  1970  (1980) 
1. Exports : Table 4  21.8  30.9  45.9  ~- (67.9) 
2.  Exports : Table 4 (modified) (1)  21.8  30.9  38  (51) 
3.  lmports : Table 4  18.8  33.0  55.4  (93.4) 
4. lmports: Table 5  18.8  33.0  50.8  (84.8) 
5. lmports : Table 6  18.8  37.3  57.5  (80.7) 
6.  lmports : Table 5  18.8  31.9  73.9  (191.6) 
(
1
)  Modified according to FAO projections. For example: increase in exports of sugar and vegetahle oils 1957-1959 to 1970 approximately 
20%; FAO: Agricultural Commodities Projections for 1970, Rome 1962. 
TABLE  8 
MODEL:  INCREASE IN  THE  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' EXPORTS 
NEEDED  TO  FINANCE  THEIR IMPORT REQUIREMENTS 
1. lm  ports (1) 
2.  Exports (2) 
3. Difference 1-2 
(1)  See Table 7, average of 3 to S. 
(2)  See Table 7. 
Composition of Exports 
1960  1970 
33  55 
31  38 
17 
(US  S  '000 million) 
(1980) 
(90) 
(51) 
(39) 
(in%) 
Food  Other raw materials  Manufactures 
According to Table 9 for 1958 
Assumption for  1970 
Possible export increase 1960-1970 = US  $7 000 million 
of which 30% for food  = US  $2100 million 
Needed export increase 1960-1970: 
Possible export increase  = US  $  7000 million 
Excess of imports over exports 
1970  =  US  $17 000 million 
of which 30% for  food 
= US  $24 000  million 
= US  $  7 200 million 
35  33  16 
30  35  17 
51 TABLE 9 
COMMODITY  COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
IN 1958 ACCORDING  TO SITC SECTIONS 
(in % of Total Exports and lmports) 
Food  Other raw  Ma chi  nery  Other  Total 
ma te rials (1)  manufactures  manufactures 
SITC Section  0  +  1  2  +  4  7  6+8  5  to 8 
Exports 
Latin America  41  16  - 6  7 
Middle East  6  3  - 3  4 
Africa (excl. Middle East)  34  44  1  18  20 
ECAFE Asia (excl. Japan)  29  39  1  18  20 
Unweighted average  35  33  1  14  16 
lmports 
Latin America  11  4  34  25  67 
Middle East  17  4  27  35  67 
Africa (excl. Middle East)  16  8  26  34  67 
ECAFE Asia (excl. Japan)  21  9  22  29  59 
Unweighted average  16  7  34  29  64 
(1)  Excluding fuels. 
Source: From UN/ECE: Economie Survey of Europe in 1960, Geneva 1961. 
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